The Reluctant Debutante: The European Union as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood. CEPS Working Documents No. , 1 July. The Reluctant Debutante may refer to: The Reluctant Debutante (play), a play by William Create a book · Download as PDF · Printable version. Centre for European CEPS Working Document Policy Studies No. / July The Reluctant Debutante The European Union as Promoter of Democracy in.
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In its discourse, the EU places democracy and the rule of law as number one. This paper examines the extent to which the EU is a coherent. The Reluctant Debutante: The European Union as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood. PDF Download (Kb) | Preview. The Reluctant Debutante book. Read 3 reviews from the world's largest community for readers. It is a light-hearted, almost farcical, comedy which revolve .
They wear cardigan sweaters and dark skirts, and they have no noticeable waists. Their hair is softly waved and sprayed in place. She has stepped, you might say, into the wrong picture. Margaret Phillips left after that year. They said she had been fired, like our math teacher Beau Birdwell, for doing unseemly things. Louis County. Her window gives onto the carefully seeded, amoeba-shaped patches of lawn peculiar to late-twentieth-century universities, with a huge parking complex off to one side and frail trees, supported by wires and rubber hoses, waving like thin children along the edges of curving walks.
The wide vowels of the South still come out in her speech, sharpened at the edges with midwestern consonants.
She scarcely remembers me, though she has vivid recollections of Phoebe Scott and—to my surprise—of my father. Although he was teaching future Army officers, Ned Phillips considered himself a political liberal. But Professor Phillips was a genteel sort of liberal, one that stayed within the system and discussed issues rationally. I thought I could separate my academics from my politics. I remember Mr.
Birdwell as bald, plump, and ingratiating. Now I learn that he was weighed down by his marriage to a manicdepressive but in love with numbers and with music. They had spotted a known drug dealer coming to sit next to him at a table in a jazz bar in Gaslight Square, a downtown area famous for starting the careers of blues greats Chuck Berry and B. By the time the police had questioned Beau and let him go, the press had got hold of the story.
The next morning, the school fired him. But nothing changed. I had no aptitude for it and little interest. We took pixie-haired Miss Phillips outside. We sat her down on the broad steps of the school entrance with its Ionic pillars or on the wrought-iron benches of the Alumnae Garden. We learned quickly that we could drop Cicero and take up Marx.
All semester we talked about the theory of class. We praised the late Dr. Martin Luther King, whom our parents had not abided. I loved it. When I walked into the final exam and actually saw a passage of Cicero, I burst into tears.
Later, when we all pulled Bs, we concluded that Miss Phillips had abandoned, along with other bourgeois hierarchies, the idea of grades.
They thought I was so green, nothing I could do would matter. No, I left on my own. Margaret and George talked about religion and about the church in South Carolina where Margaret had gone as a child. George took her to St. Still, her name pops up everywhere in the literature.
Although they were certainly aware that McDonnell was involved in military projects, theirs was not a war protest. Rather, they thought media coverage of a break-in would be bigger than coverage of a demonstration outside the complex, and so the issue of discrimination would come to the fore.
Margaret looks abashed, telling me this story. It was about jobs. Margaret remembers my father as surprisingly kind, casting significant looks at her when it was a good moment to raise an objection. Putting one another on the stand, the two women got a hung jury.
She shrugs. My father used to roll the R of Rickhoff and cough the k. At the second syllable, he gave a quick derisive shake of his head.
There was a great rivalry among the judges. My father liked to say he, too, had thrown the book at people. In my memory he never has a kind word to spare for McDonnell Douglas.
He did not want his wife to work there, or anywhere. The interview itself had taken place three weeks before the ball, when neither Margaret Phillips nor anyone outside the inner circle knew that Phoebe was slated to be Queen. Miss Phillips had chosen her only because she was willing, and because she had been an excellent student in Latin.
The photo in the newspaper had flattered Phoebe; Percy was no more than a dark oval under the mushroom of his beret. I disapproved of the whole business and was bursting with jealousy.
I watched Hugh Scott work the room, extending his hand, touching women on their elbows and slapping men on their shoulder blades. People like Hugh Scott and Margaret Phillips, it seemed to me, knew who they were. Wherever they stood, they knew how they were expected to act, what the stakes were. My family—my father—had never really learned the game. Champagne was being poured.
Outside it was raining, a damp St. Louis Christmas season. I wondered where Michael Edson was. I hoped no one would crack McGovern jokes. I prayed I would look pretty in my dress. Six The Invitations Wherever the appearance of a conventional aristocracy exists in America, it must arise from wealth, as it cannot from birth. Louis Mercantile Library. The Mercantile is also a study in the devolution of St.
When I arrive to do research, dozens of boxes are piled by the closely guarded entrance. The library is packing up to move to a University of Missouri campus in the county. She shakes her head fondly. Veiled Prophet Queen, Photo taken in the library of her family home.
She stands before an oval mirror and a wall of bookshelves topped by candelabra. Her hair is cropped and crimped close to her head, in the style of the time. She holds a gargantuan bouquet of autumn flowers.
The materials from the library are endless. There are financial records from the St. There are portraits of former Queens, including the one who had married in secret and was therefore run out of town, and the one who, soon after marrying an Italian count, slit her wrists. I lose track of what I am seeking. Leaving my materials in the good hands of the librarian, I take a walk for lunch. There is nowhere to eat in this part of downtown.
I walk a labyrinth of perhaps ten blocks in the damp chill. The buildings are all square, dozen-storied, brick or stone artifacts, with gargoyles occasionally leering from crumbling cornices. Corner grocery stores are boarded up; signs in front of defunct diners hang off rusting braces.
Building directories list bail bondsmen, tattoo artists, and printers. A dozen storefronts are boarded up and graffitied. Through the space between buildings I glimpse the north foot of the Arch.
I consider driving somewhere to eat. But when I circle around by the main entrance of the library again, I give up and reenter. Perhaps, I think, the library employees all bring sandwiches.
Perhaps they huddle in a little room somewhere, with vending machines. I leaf through my research materials, but I cannot escape this new vision of my home city as a collection of half-empty offices with dirty windows in which the stubborn remaining few wash down braunschweiger sandwiches with a warm Bud.
The Gooey Butter anchors my stomach and makes everything else unnecessary. That evening I eat like a princess, leaving food on my plate. After supper my mother fetches a box from her study.
My mother saved them. What she has saved for me are a couple dozen Veiled Prophet Ball invitations, stretching back over the last century, and they take my breath away. It is impossible not to admire them. Bisecting a printed green maple branch on the front of the pouch is an oval image of the Prophet. He looks burdened, pensive, like Moses; the maple branch could be his burning bush.
Out of the silk pouch I pull an intricately folded square of thick stationery, which also has the image of the Prophet and the maple branch printed on it. Untying the silk ribbon that seals the paper, I extract the invitation, a folded, gilt-edged card. Glued to the front is a square duotone lithograph that is hidden behind three hinged ovals that overlay the image from the corners.
All three of the ovals depict the same Arabian-looking figure, with pointy shoes and curved sword, but they are of different scenes—the first shows the figure receiving a gleaming art-deco vision of armor; the second is of him being hoisted aloft on his carpet by a fantastic bird of prey; and in the third, mermaids accompany him to a tropical island.
The last oval lifts to reveal a seated young woman, presumably Scheherazade of A Thousand and One Nights, faced by her pudgy turbaned bodyguard, his scimitar at the ready.
Bottom, invitation to the Veiled Prophet Ball, From the open bottom of the envelope I slip out what appears to be a triangular book, wrapped in brown paper, with Arabic-looking characters scrolled on the flap and an Arabic-looking red seal closing the wrap.
As if I were opening Chinese boxes, I come upon another bookish triangle, this time in maroon leatherette, the flap folded and tucked into a small crease toward the point of the triangle. I open the flap again, and this time the invitation proper slides out. Louis Chamber of Commerce, Oct. On the left half of the triangle is the gilt Prophet, again in an oval, somber but less downhearted this time, staring soberly ahead, with his chain-mailed arms holding aloft a half-unrolled scroll that one might take for the Code of Hammurabi.
On the right, pairing the Prophet, is William Shakespeare, equally somber, staring, and pointing toward an enormous globe, to a spot that seems to be somewhere in the middle of America.
The triangles open further, inviting me to turn over to what is now a diamond of four triangular, full-color images, reading clockwise. Flipping the card back, I find a pair of images to sum up the story.
In the right triangle sits a Grecian-style lady on a robe of the American flag, her left elbow lightly resting on a framed portrait of George Washington. In one hand she holds a book, in the other a pen. In the coffee-colored clouds below her are two miniature tableaux—of Washington addressing Congress and of winter on the Potomac.
At her feet lie a pair of American Beauty roses. Her partner, in the right-hand triangle, is more modern-looking—her face slightly sharper, her hair curled around her shoulders. The robe on which she reclines boasts the red and gold of the Prophet; the Grand Oracle himself stares wistfully from the frame on which she leans.
In her right hand is the eagle scepter, in her left a goblet that in contrast to the sun supplies the light above her head. The tableaux in the clouds represent the railroads and the telephone, proclaiming the material progress of a century. The admission cards are in the form of arrowheads, the size and shape of the ones we used to hunt on trips to the Ozark Mountains. The one for the gentleman is painted with a blue ribbon; the one for the lady, with a red.
Weapons transformed, by Will and George and the Grand Oracle, into tokens for the ball. They go on and on—invitations in the form of Chinese folding puzzles; invitations like full-color lithographs to frame and hang on your wall; invitations featuring the Prophet rising like Neptune from the azure depths of an endless sea; and invitations with a younger, more Clark Gable—like Prophet hypnotizing you with his stare and surrounded by the Inventions of Man, from fire to electricity.
My parents left these ashtrays and carafes around the house. The invitation, which my mom preserved along with the others, resembles a wedding announcement, rectangular and white. It was a lousy gift, everyone agreed, and unfair to us girls, and what the world was coming to with trashy gifts like this, no one could predict. Z Z Z Echoing a wave of sentiment among supporters of the ball, my mother used to liken the event to a party. Then you do the city a big favor by having a lovely parade where people on floats throw candy to children watching.
Everybody can come to that. What a generous thing! I could be an awful person. The Mallinckrodts are very prominent. We talked, most often, in the living room, where she settled into her olive green leather armchair, with its rectangular cushion that went poossh when you sat on it. While we talked she knitted or did needlepoint.
We all wore her sweaters proudly, even if the others at our private schools laughed at their bulkiness and complicated nubs. But mostly I admired her talents, none of which I shared, enough to overcome my shame at possessing a mother who created things with her hands. Let them have their own party, if they like, and not invite you. All your friends will be going!
She shook the sweater arm she was knitting and frowned at it as if it had misbehaved. Because of her knitting, she once told me, they had changed the rules at Washington University, forbidding all students to do handicrafts during lectures. My mother earned a degree in business. That she had not been a Maid at the ball was a piece of history we all took for granted. She had graduated from University City High School. This fact, I also took for granted, was the main reason I had been sent there.
Seven The Motions Watch over our school, O Lord, As its years increase, And bless and guide her daughters, Wherever they may be Keeping them ever unspotted from the world. Clearly, academics had nothing to do with my being placed in Mary Institute. On the other hand, Brown v. Board of Education had been decided.
At the public high school, they were grinding their hips to Elvis. Jazz and reefers were out of the box and in the news.
Louis Country Day. Most of life, it seemed, had to do with remaining among your friends. I do not know that we at Mary Institute remained unspotted.
We did learn, in Upper School dance class, to bow to the floor and rise again without our hips wobbling or our knees cracking. Sallie Estep, who sat in front of me in study hall, learned more.
She also returned with boyshort hair and a penchant for Angela Davis. She set up a rack outside the Senior Room and sold all her clothes except one plain black dress, which she washed daily and wore until it shredded at the seams; then she bought a brown dress and did the same with that. Then we tried out for field hockey. Throughout my years at Mary Institute, I operated with the illusion that my commadres were, like me, going through the motions. Life as I understood it lay where Sallie Estep had briefly gone— somewhere outside and beyond.
We enacted this role with a wink toward one another. We would discard it as we attained our majority and the revolution commenced. Z Z Z When he arrived in St. His beard, while scruffy, was long enough to require extensive combing, which he did as a nervous habit, with a black pocket comb missing a few of its teeth. He held onto his vowels in a druggy variation on the popular pot-laced humor of Cheech and Chong. He stood in front of our hall mirror, combing his beard.
I felt, simultaneously, the sensations of perfect success and utter failure. Success because Michael embodied nearly everything of which my parents would disapprove without just cause. Failure because one look at my mother convinced me that whatever her faults, she did not deserve such an ungrateful, stubborn, and stupid daughter as I had turned out to be.
I was busy marveling at how a well-cut tailcoat could make even Michael Edson appear attractive. He looked taller than usual, his beard was combed, and the jacket padded his shoulders nicely. I had been to several of these, the previous summer, with varying degrees of lavish outlay. An heiress to the fortune of Mallinckrodt Chemical Corporation, Ann had not even applied to college.
While the rest of us were losing our collective virginity to one track athlete or another, she was renting her own flat in London. Guests were encouraged to attend in costume, and I had made myself a flounced skirt split up the front, with a lacy leotard underneath.
Louis was a French town. The young men made a gesture of dressing up, with a top hat or suspenders, but mostly they attended as the props on which the women hung their wares. The more I danced, the happier I was to be a cancan girl. I felt pretty. I felt California. I felt slightly slutty. There were other parties, most of them exercises in alcohol tolerance. My brother Dan attended more than I, as it was considered etiquette to have more men than women.
He loved the professionalism, if I can call it that, of these affairs—the sense that he qualified for attendance, for the clubby jokes by the bar and the group memories of similar parties, of long drunken drives into the country or skinny dips in the country club pool before dawn.
We both laughed, low and catty. I was ashamed of myself—but as Michael and I wove our way through the perfumed crowd at the Missouri Bar Association, I thought it was all sort of a joke, my brother included, and we were the jokesters.
Everyone was smoking cigarettes. Girls within reach of blond had frosted their hair and cropped it to their shoulders. No one had any skin problems, anymore.
As they spotted me, they pointed their cigarettes at me and scrunched their faces into what might have been the beginning of a laugh. I introduced Michael.
His hand hung limply in theirs. They smirked at me as if he were a catch—a poor catch, but one on which they were prepared to congratulate me. I did my best to look blank. We drank gin and tonics at the bar. Michael was chatty and oblivious, smoking cigarettes, gesturing with his hands. He was, I believe, discoursing on the bombing of Haiphong Harbor, an issue that the Nixon administration had avoided up to the moment of its election the month before.
He looked Michael up and down. Then he reached over to grab hold of the silver coke spoon Michael was wearing around his neck, over his tie. He glared. I thought he had probably had too many martinis. Gently I led Michael away. You ever hear of Phyllis Schlafly? As I had when dressed as a cancan girl, I believed my exotic accoutrement—in this case, Michael Romanov—gave me access to the other girls that I had heretofore lacked.
My boyfriend. She did not. She looked puzzled. I believe I then asked her if she thought there would be any action at the ball. She took a sip of her drink, a lime green concoction in a crystal tumbler. The Black Panthers or whatever. Something to wake the party up. Eyes were very blue, that year—tinted contacts had just come in, and shadow was applied above and below the eyes, giving pretty young women that bruised look.
I plowed straight ahead. Do you have any idea how much this shit costs? When Michael Romanov came over, waggling his antique tiki god, I was almost grateful to him, to his blithe willingness, his having no stake in this matter. I had my own room, though not one I had ever lived in when I lived at home. I hung my party dress in a closet with a sliding door, next to the hanging bags in which my mother kept out-of-season suits and dresses.
Some of my old furniture was in the room; some of it had been sold or stored. I knew my mother and sister lived in this house, but everything about it felt temporary to me. Lying in bed, I missed things in turns. My cat Socrates, who had slept with me in my dorm room back in California. My dorm room itself, with its odor of new paint and the bougainvillea outside the window. My old cat, who had slept with me as I grew up, and who had escaped from this house to run down the weedy hill onto Ladue Road, where she was killed by a car.
The room I had grown up in, back in Clayton, with its window that gave onto the front porch roof, where I could sneak out at night and meditate under the stars.
My father and mother, sleeping on the other side of the connecting bathroom in that house, their peevishness soothed by slumber. And then I woke, and it was the day of the ball.
Michael was slouching in my doorway, in a brownish Indian robe, grinning behind his beard. You know, with grass. You know how to make brownies, right?
I squinted at him; the light through the window was bright. Snow had fallen during the night. Toklas brownies had to be the sine qua non of prankster activity.
It was the sort of stunt you read about in underground comics. The mothers loosened up and had sex; the children, slightly horrified, locked up the rest of their stash. I liked getting high, as Michael knew. In fact, I had not thought of making my debut on a marijuana high, but now that Michael had mentioned it, there seemed no other way to get through the evening than on the slow magic carpet of cannabis.
He stepped into the room and up to the bed. He leaned his thighs into my knees. I breathed in the cheeselike odor of his crotch. My mother had gone to work; my brother slept in the one-room carriage house in the backyard; and my sister had spent the night with a friend.
I was wearing the unsexiest thing I owned, a flowered Lanz flannel gown. I pictured flinging it off, standing on the bed in my young naked glory, and telling Michael Edson to take me. My mouth twisted. I ate two and Michael ate three, then we wrapped up some to cram into my pocketbook and into his coat pocket.
It was snowing outside, the wet heavy flakes of the lower Midwest. We opened all the windows and ran the blower over the stove on high. Then Michael went for a walk in the mushy stuff while I took a shower and began the methodical process of getting ready: I rolled my hair onto blue Velcro tubes. Guilt was a by-product, disposable. We were on our way. Louis, I find a labor dispute.
Three hours takes me to Kansas City, then another hour north to Maryville, home of Northwest Missouri State University and the author of the only book-length study of the Veiled Prophet Ball.
I discovered Thomas Spencer by doing a keyword search for articles featuring the words Veiled and Prophet in any combination. There were, needless to say, few articles that contained both terms, and the rest had nothing to do with the St. He struck them as an outsider, asking rote questions.
But his careful accumulation of historical evidence has connected, for me, a series of dots from the dread Mokanna to the slender Santa Claus. Had anyone asked why I was going to Maryville, I would have said I was doing research.
But there remains little Tom Spencer can tell me that his book has not divulged. The fact is that I am driving simply to meet this young man who has drawn such sharp outlines from the murky past. I pass the low hills above the Ozarks, driving through the last vestiges of damp air before I hit the hundredth meridian.
In a snowless January, the land looks scraped bare. Missouri is tied with Tennessee for having the most other states touching its borders. I discovered this fact during an idle moment in fourth-grade geography and have never forgotten it. Multiple borders and crossings inexorably link and define my home state. To the people with whom I attended college in California, Missouri—and especially St. From St. Louis, it seems, you can go anywhere.
Scott Joplin did, and T. Burroughs, all of these people and more sprang from here to seek their fortunes. Louis as their jumping-off point? Louis and the first balloon flight around the globe navigated by a St. Yet it is that very malleable, externally derived character that makes St. Louis an ideal place to be from—an ideal place, that is, to leave. One can adapt oneself to other parts of America because there is always a wisp of St.
Louis in every place where one might settle. Louis assumptions for another. Being able to live anywhere you choose is another way of saying that you come from nowhere, or everywhere. Tom Spencer lives with his pregnant wife and his toddler in an overly furnished house on a gray street in a university town. He is a tall, soft young man who is concerned mostly with his prospects for tenure. We take a walk to the center of town for coffee.
And with another little one coming. I feel as if I have suddenly sprouted green antlers. But part of me wants to protest, as those elongated one-eyed aliens might have protested to the well-meaning captain, You do not understand us at all. Louis, is a modern reprise of King Lear. That is, it tells the story of a powerful father and the daughters who vie for his legacy. That the father might be pigheaded or mad is beside the point, as is the money he has to bestow.
The women seek his blessing. When he withholds it, they go sour and mean. I had let him down so much, in so many ways. Surely I could give him this. Surely for once I could do the right thing, could be beautiful in the right way, could be Cordelia. And just as surely, I was determined to give him nothing at all. Perhaps this is what is afoot with me. If what lay behind the mess and the greed, however much we may posture and condemn, was love. I mean all of us, the fathers too.
Though the quest remains personal, of course. Once seen as the perimeter of civilization in St. Louis, the park is now a place for caution after dark.
I follow the paper trail that Tom Spencer has mapped. When I need air, I cross the boulevard and stride up the spongy turf of the city golf course to Museum Hill, where we used to sled and where the weak sun beats down on the statue of Saint Louis astride his horse.
This notion has lead-balloon appeal and soon gives way to the Arch, the Gateway to the West. Whatever his symbolic weaknesses, he has the foundingfather look down pat. My father and Nancy live just over the border from Clayton into Ladue, in an umbral house with family portraits and framed documents on the walls.
Her reign was at perhaps the height of cotillion splendor in the Midwest. The stock market was booming. Wealth and female beauty were idolized and celebrated. Over this, Mary Ambrose Smith was to rule. Unhappily, as I have just discovered, Miss Smith learned of her planned coronation only a few days before the ball itself. She was living in Atlanta at the time and had that very week, in secret, married a young banker. Sheppard Smith, who had counted on this moment to enshrine his place in the business world.
I picture her treading the long white carpet, her eyes gleaming, her train flowing behind her, approaching the seated Prophet, as she hopes against hope that she can do her part and be, years later, forgiven.
He takes pride in this homemaking skill. Nancy works—with his approval, he always adds—and is gone from the house all day. I toast whole wheat bread and get the peanut butter out of the fridge. His sister Ann, he points out, learned her lesson from Mary. And there was this fellow Joe Harris down from Detroit. And he danced with Ann more than once, you can rely on that! My father nods. He sticks his pinkie finger into the pot of soup, to test it, then he licks the finger.
He dresses in a clean oxford shirt every day, with a cardigan sweater and a nicely buffed pair of wingtips. When he goes out, he wears a fedora, but he rarely goes out in the winter. He is eighty-eight and believes with almost equal fervor in the divinity of Christ and the miracles of modern medicine. Later in the Depression, when his father announced that tuition funds were no longer available, he put himself through law school by creating and then coaching the fencing team at Washington University.
But you know, she became engaged to Joe about a month after the ball.
Mary Smith got deported. A fleck of barley erupts from his mouth. His thin lips tremble. A few weeks later she married Joe, opening the door to the rest of her life. My father and I do not discuss what he and I both know. Joe Harris was Jewish. After leaving his father, Harmon, his mother brought him up in Switzerland, and when he returned to the States, he passed as Gentile.
Joe and Ann attended the Episcopal church in St. Louis and later in Mystic, Connecticut. No customer reviews. Share your thoughts with other customers. Write a customer review. site Giveaway allows you to run promotional giveaways in order to create buzz, reward your audience, and attract new followers and customers. Learn more about site Giveaway. This item: Set up a giveaway.
There's a problem loading this menu right now. Learn more about site Prime. Get fast, free shipping with site Prime. Back to top. Get to Know Us. site Payment Products. English Choose a language for shopping. site Music Stream millions of songs. site Advertising Find, attract, and engage customers. Former colonial powers have tended to be hesitant to intervene politically in their former colonies, as perhaps in the case of France and Spain in the Maghreb.
On the other hand, the Baltic and Central European states, after their occupation by the Soviet Union, show the same logic turned around, with a much greater inclination to make points of political principle towards Russia.
Some rather subtle blends of national and EU roles are possible. Another type of situation is where the member state may be politically inhibited from championing a strong democracy promotion policy in a former colony, but sees an advantage in the EU exploiting its historical innocence to pursue such policies more freely. We shall see examples in practice below. Case studies Balkans The EU has advanced its relations with the Balkan countries within the framework of two separate policies — the enlargement process and the stabilisation and association process SAP.
Both policies aim at domestic political and economic transformation of the target countries in preparation for full integration in the EU.
Bulgaria and Romania are part of the Central and Eastern European group for which the enlargement strategy was devised shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The five Western Balkan countries received the conditional offer of EU membership in shortly after peace had been restored in the region and the member states had decided to secure the long-term stability in the former Yugoslav republics by bringing them into the European mainstream.
The recipe is encoded in the Copenhagen accession criteria demanding a prospective member to endorse the community values of democracy and rule of law in order to be admitted as an equal member of the club. The EU membership conditionality touches on the core of the political systems of would-be members and affects a wide spectrum of policy domains through legal harmonisation with the acquis communautaire.
Democracy-building features high on the enlargement agenda. In the Western Balkans, however, the democracy goal is coupled with and complicated by the process of state-building and state consolidation. The EU conditionality in the Western Balkan context has a double objective of building viable states and steering the transition to democratic governance and rule of law.
The former Yugoslav republics of the Western Balkans have an extra layer of problems to address as a consequence of the wars of secession in former Yugoslavia in the s and the fragile state structures that emerged as a result of the peace settlements. In the Western Balkan region, therefore, the driving forces behind the EU policy are the security concerns of the member states, and the goal of maintaining peace and building viable states comes first.
The democracy objective is not less important but it becomes a matter of highest priority only after a stable security environment is put in place and the outstanding statehood questions are resolved. The Stabilisation and Association process is especially designed to stabilise and strengthen the Western Balkan states in order to make them credible accession candidates to which the full range of democracy requirements will then be applied. The EU has taken over various security tasks in the Western Balkans through both military and civilian means.
The EU police missions in Macedonia and BiH constitute further attempts to strengthen the capacity of the Balkan states and help them enforce law and order in their societies. Both interests and values converge in the Balkans context to produce a strong consensus in the EU on the goals and methods of the EU policy.
While coherent in principle, the EU can still appear inconsistent in the execution of its policy. In the enlargement cases of the Eastern Balkans, this tendency is less pronounced.
There, the European Commission is the sole agent of democracy conditionality. As a manager of the enlargement process, the Commission is the institutional player evaluating the state of democracy in each candidate and enjoys large discretion in demanding aspiring governments to improve democratic practices and human rights provisions in their countries. The split of the EU mandate between the European Commission and the Council has, however, not always played out well in practice and at times the two institutional agents have been perceived as speaking with two different voices instead of complementing each other to achieve the EU policy goals.
Bulgaria is a country where the EU classical enlargement recipe is applied. The European Commission has been the main EU actor executing conditionality in the pre-enlargement period, with the member states acting in agreement with the Commission and in support of the common values of democracy and rule of law. More seriously, the country lagged behind in economic reform and was deemed economically unprepared to fully integrate in the single market.
As a result, Bulgaria was not invited to start accession negotiations at the Luxembourg European Council in December together with the first five front-runners from Central and Eastern Europe. The more the Commission learned about the institutional structure and the legal basis of Bulgaria, the more deficiencies it saw in them.
The delayed accession timetable for Bulgaria, considered not ready to join the EU with the first wave of 10 countries in May , sent a strong signal to Sofia to step up its efforts.
As a result, important constitutional amendments and legislative changes were made in Bulgaria, facilitating substantial reform of the judicial system. In order to ensure full implementation of the commitments the Bulgarian authorities undertook during the closing phase of the accession negotiations, the EU included a special safeguard clause in the accession treaty with Bulgaria explicitly linking the completion of judiciary reform with the accession date of and envisaging a delay of one year in case of failure to reform.
Croatia is officially part of the Stabilisation and Association Process, although an EU candidacy status was conferred upon it in after the Commission judged that the country has substantially fulfilled the Copenhagen political and economic criteria.
Yet, Croatia has been subject to some specific conditionality, a consequence of the Yugoslav wars of s. There is a strong agreement in the EU and the international community at large that cooperation with the ICTY constitutes a key element in building a state based on the rule of law where crime, including war crime, is prosecuted and punished.
There is also a strong consensus that dealing with the issue of war crimes in war-divided societies is part of the societal process of coming to terms with the past and reconciliation. The member states that were arguing for immediate start of accession talks could not block this punitive EU position, since the decision to open negotiations required unanimity. This case is illustrative of the EU unanimity rule resulting in the highest standards of political conditionality being effectively applied, rather than the reverse.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina BiH , the EU has demanded a long-term transformation process in a number of areas that form an intrinsic part of the democratisation agenda, including the building of democratic institutions, securing guarantees for the rule of law, encouraging the creation of a professional public administration, stimulating the reform of the judiciary, etc.
Yet, in the Bosnian context, the goal of state-building and state consolidation is paramount in all spheres of reform. Since the end of the war in , international military troops have been stationed in BiH to maintain peace and prevent further eruption of ethnic conflict. The civilian aspects of peace implementation have been formally supervised by a High Representative of the international community HR who enjoys large discretion in dismissing elected politicians and imposing legislation where and when he considers it appropriate.
While these extraordinary powers have been justified in the immediate aftermath of the conflict to get the reconstruction and transformation processes going, they have progressively become a brake on autonomous decision-making and domestic political bargaining and coalition-building.
The advances in many reform areas have happened so far due to external interventions and local actors have had limited ownership over the process. The more the HR issues decrees, the less the domestic space for self-governance which is at the heart of a democratically-functioning system.
From the point of view of coordination of external action, the EU-demanded institutional and legislative changes have been in line with the policy of the rest of the international community present in the country. There are numerous international organisations in BiH with different priorities, but they are all united in their objective to build a functioning multi-ethnic state in BiH where minority protection and government efficiency co-exist.
The EU conditionality in this sense enjoys the consensual support of all other external actors. The EU institutional actors themselves coordinate their activities on the ground in an effective manner. And even though his tasks go beyond the strictly-defined EU mandate, he has fully supported the EU conditionality and has actively pursued the reforms prescribed by Brussels.
Regardless of the many other external actors in BiH, the EU has managed to speak with one voice, and to deliver a consistent message compatible with the one of the rest of the international community. The EU institutional coherence in the Bosnian context is not the norm in the conduct of the EU policy towards Serbia and Montenegro even though the objectives are similar — state-building as a matter of most urgent priority and democratisation as an equally important but long-term goal.
All EU efforts have been oriented towards preventing further state disintegration and fragmentation of the region into micro-states. Not only does the EU fear recurrence of violence and further conflict, but it also has a structural problem of institutionally integrating many smaller entities from a region to which it has promised membership.
The technical details of the settlement did not matter that much as long as the geopolitical objective of keeping the common state together was fulfilled.
The technicalities, however, matter a great deal to the European Commission since it is the EU institution that has to assess the capacity of the State Union to conclude a Stabilisation and Association Agreement SAA and to take up the obligations under a contractual relationship with the EU.
As a manager of the SAP, the Commission is interested in having a credible partner at the State Union level sufficiently empowered for efficient decision-making concerning the EU accession process. Because the Commission is driven by a different set of objectives, its view on the workability and even desirability of the thin common state structure does not necessarily coincide with that of the member states.
Indeed, the member states have set the EU foreign policy line in Serbia and Montenegro, and the European Commission is in no position to reverse the EU policy orientation.
The Commission, however, finds itself in a difficult position to combine its technocratic responsibility to measure objectively the compliance of potential candidates with the objectives of EU foreign policy, retaining it its own levers of power in the SAP process while remaining junior partner to Solana politically. The EU is therefore not a unitary actor in the Serbia-Montenegro political context, notwithstanding the fact that it is the only external actor deploying influence on the statehood disagreements between the two republics.
The voice of Solana has focused on the security interests of the EU member states, while the voice of the European Commission has focused on technical aspects of compliance with pre-accession conditionality and ultimately progress towards EU membership. Domestic actors are well aware of this division in the foreign policy portfolio in the Serbia-Montenegro case, and it affects how they respond to EU conditionality. Turkey Despite the fact that the issue of Turkish accession has always been on and off the table of EU policy-makers since , a serious debate on the subject only took off recently with the granting of candidacy status to Turkey and the possibility of the start of accession negotiations.
The rejection was justified on the grounds that Turkey lacked a functioning democratic political system. In the s, there was almost a tacit alliance between the member states on the Turkey question. The dominance of Christian Democrat parties in Europe also helped the emergence of an almost unanimous rejection of any prospects for accession. A similar attitude could also be observed at the European Parliament.
Here, the discussion never even reached the point of membership but focused mainly on the human rights problems which were quite severe in the s amidst the ongoing armed conflict of the Turkish military with the Kurdish terrorist organisation, the PKK. Turkey was harshly criticised for its human rights violations and even the customs union agreement barely managed to obtain the approval of the European Parliament. As discourse and action are inseparable variables, it did not come as a surprise to many when Turkey was excluded from the enlargement lists at the Luxembourg Summit of However, the strong reactions of the Turkish government, the changing international climate after the Kosovo War and the rapprochement with Greece started leading to shifts in European positions in the following two years.
Turkey was eventually granted candidacy status at the Helsinki Summit of , with the new Social Democrat government in Germany playing a leading role. Turkey was now subject to the same formal mechanisms used for the Central and Eastern European countries to guide and measure progress on the Copenhagen criteria.
These first signs of EU conditionality provided the initial trigger for change. These reforms were the first crucial responses to EU conditionality, passed under a fragile three- party coalition government that included the highly Eurosceptic right-wing nationalist party in Turkey.
As Turkey began to reform itself internally, the objective factors that stood in the way between Turkey and the EU, such as human rights, the protection of minorities and the excessive role of the military in political life, began to dissipate. Hence, EU impact was not only confined to pure conditionality but extended to cover technical and financial assistance.
Pre-accession financial assistance would 11 A term of reference for a draft law consisting of a collection of amendments to different laws designed to amend more than one code or law at a time, which was approved or rejected in a single voting session in the parliament.
Accession Prospects and Issues, London: Routledge, The strengthening of the credibility of conditionality was immediately reflected in the four subsequent reform packages adopted by the Turkish government AKP and two sets of constitutional amendments, leading up to the decision to open accession negotiations at the Brussels Summit of The single-party rule of AKP, following their electoral victory in November elections, was very effective in translating the strengthening of conditionality into real change in the domestic sphere by deepening the reform process initiated by the previous coalition government.
In fact, the advocates of a previously religious-based anti-establishment party played a significant role behind political reforms due to a combination of interests and ideological concerns. The profound political and economic transformation initiated in the s, especially de-ruralisation coupled with the failed policies of the strong state and the increasingly corrupt parties of the centre, had already paved the way for the emergence of a stronger civil society and identity- related politics in Turkey, most notably regarding political Islam and the Kurdish identity.
Trigger or Anchor for Reform? This significantly helped create a more conducive environment for political reform, particularly in the area of human rights and minority rights as well as freedom of expression and association.
While domestic change in Turkey was made possible through the interaction between domestic actors and the European Union, in the post period, EU actors did not have a coherent view on how EU relations with Turkey should develop. The scope of debate on the future of Europe was being widened by the European Convention, which raised issues on the future of Europe and European identity, and in this context the case of Turkey provoked widely divergent positions. Amidst these debates, the actors of EU policy-making started taking their positions.
The biggest divisions occurred within and between the member states themselves. The high number of Turks in Germany, traditionally supportive of the SPD and the Greens, was another important factor behind this support.
Britain was firmly supportive of Turkish membership. Tony Blair put forward similar arguments to Schroeder and Fischer on the strategic importance of Turkey in general and its potential as a role model for the Middle East in particular. The Conservatives also argued along the same lines, although expectedly more explicit in their emphasis on the possible reinforcing effects of Turkish accession upon the intergovernmentalist structure of the EU.
France on the other hand was the most negative, among the core three. Despite his rhetorical support for Turkish membership, President Chirac repeatedly asserted that the accession negotiations might fail and that alternative scenarios for such a case have to be devised.
He insisted on a referendum to be held in France on Turkish membership upon the completion of negotiations, which was subsequently entrenched as an amendment to the French Constitution. His arguments focused on the identity issue as well as certain threat perceptions.
According to Sarkozy and the centre-right in France, an EU with Turkey would not resemble anything more than a free trade area. This widespread perception was triggered by two major concerns. Other countries in the EU were also divided on the issue. The Netherlands was ambivalent whereas the Scandinavian countries were generally in favour, despite strong opposition particularly by the extreme right that is strong in some member states such as Denmark.
The Commission, on the other hand, has in general been cautiously supportive of Turkish accession. The former enlargement Commissioner Verheugen often emphasised that there is no alternative to full membership for Turkey so long as the country fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria. The changeover at the Commission does not seem to be reversing this trend. Although some party groups in the EP had a more or less coherent and united position on the issue, many continued to voice discordant views due to the differences in the opinions of national party delegations.
The debates over Turkey intensified prior to the EP elections in June and the general position of the EP became clearer with the reactions to the Oostlander Report which was adopted in April In a similar fashion, in the wake of the crucial Brussels Summit, the Parliament adopted the Eurlings Report in December With 50 votes in favour, 18 against and 6 abstentions, the EP recommended the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey, so long as in the first phase of negotiations, priority is given to the full implementation of the political criteria.
Hence the positions of the major policy-makers in Europe were hardly coherent on the issue of Turkish membership.
The Commission was by far the most positive, followed by the Parliament who put the most emphasis, as expected, on the political criteria. Such divisions were overcome in the long-awaited December Brussels European Council summit of that gave concessions to all parties concerned. Provisions were also there to satisfy those who were against full membership.
Such developments are not expected to prevent the formation of a superficial unity to open accession negotiations in October The Commission has recently confirmed that accession talks with Turkey will begin as scheduled. Any outcome that falls short of full membership would be a deep disappointment to Turkey. Yet it seems that the dramatic wave of political reform achieved in to pushed by strong EU conditionality has become essentially irreversible.
On the other hand, further change without the EU anchor is expected to occur at a slower pace than witnessed between and Also Putin was much appreciated in his first term for reversing the chaotic unpredictability of Russian politics.
Political transition towards democracy, the rule of law and human rights has been a central feature of EU policy towards all the former Soviet Union in the early post-Soviet period.
Yet by the early s, and with the important exception of the situation in Chechnya, there was hardly a categorical difference in the apparent quality of democracy, the rule of law and human rights between Russia and Ukraine.
The South Caucasus states were regarded as small dysfunctional democracies, whereas the Central Asians revealed early on that they were not inclined at all towards democracy. The decision to enlarge to Central and Eastern Europe in the early to mids was thus followed by the creation of the Barcelona process. However the expansion of the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy in late to include the Southern Mediterranean partners as well as the new European neighbours Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus was another example of how these mild north- south tensions could be reconciled.
It is tempting to regard this as a result of the May enlargement, which brought in new members from Central and Eastern Europe with strong views on EU policy towards all the European CIS states. However, growing internal disagreements on policy towards the European CIS states, and Russia and Ukraine especially, predate the May enlargement. There developed considerable support in among the 15 member states, as well as in the Commission, Council Secretariat and European Parliament, for a more critical line towards Russia on matters of political values.
In autumn , the Nordic member states and Austria joined with seven new Central and Eastern European member states calling for a greater engagement with Ukraine and a growing reluctance to support enhanced cooperation with Russia. France and Italy had already earlier found themselves opposing a common EU position during tensions over Kaliningrad in , with both favouring a more conciliatory approach towards Russia.
It was only in this latter document that adherence to common values such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights featured, and even so only in a token manner. On the other hand, there later emerged increasing cooperation between Germany and the pro-Ukrainian camp in the Council, with joint policy papers with Poland in October , and with Poland and Lithuania in January , calling for stronger engagement with Ukraine.
Finland, France and Britain provide three examples of such changes. Upon its accession to the EU in , Finland soon became a leading advocate of a stronger and more pro-active EU policy towards Russia, seen most notably with its Northern Dimension initiative from onwards. British Prime Minister Blair was also in the forefront in courting Putin early in his first term. France was among the hardest critics of the second Russian military campaign in Chechnya from late A geopolitical argument, used mainly by Chirac, calls for an EU- Russian strategic partnership as a key building block towards the creation of a global multi- polar order.
This is supported to a greater or lesser extent by most EU actors. This argument is emphasised by Germany under Chancellor Schroeder, although it must be noted that the new member states calling for a tougher line on Russia are and education, and defer the ones on internal and external security.
Disagreement on the space on internal security revolves around the question of human rights, and treating the four spaces as a package thus becomes an example of conditionality. Denmark has for a long time been more critical of Russia than most member states; see I Spidsen for Europa Leading Europe.
In spite of the partial failure of the transition process under Yeltsin and the first war in Chechnya, the EU, led by the big member states, provided support for Yeltsin ahead of the presidential campaign. The most egregious example came during the Italian presidency in November over Chechnya as already noted and similarly with Berlusconi support to Putin over the Yukos affair.
The announced purpose of the March Paris Quartet summit of France, Germany, Spain and Russia was to encourage democratisation of Russia, based on the argument that this can be better achieved through high-level dialogue. The stance of EU member states is often coloured by their bilateral relations with Russia.
The EU-Russia summit in November had to be moved from Copenhagen to Brussels, following the holding of a conference on Chechnya in autumn As between the institutions, the Ukrainian Orange Revolution saw initially Solana and the Commission taking cautious positions. However as the crisis developed and the heads of state of Poland and Lithuania headed for Kiev to mediate a peaceful solution, Solana was brought to accompany them and ultimately played an active role in persuading Leonid Kuchman to abstain from the use of force.
The European Parliament could find allies in only a minority of member states in support of acknowledging Ukraine as a potential member of the EU. This can be seen in its numerous recommendations, statements and reports on Russia, for instance the Lalumiere report, the Oostlander report and the Bender report. Their support spans across the political 31 Carl B. Hamilton, Russia's European Economic Integration. As a result the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Ukraine was a paler version of that for Russia.
The Action Plan for Ukraine is the most developed example of the European Neighbourhood Policy, and contains a strong emphasis on democracy. Meanwhile the four common spaces agreed with Russia a few months later in May can be viewed as a weaker derivative of the Neighbourhood Action Plans, notably lacking any substantial commitments on democracy, rule of law and human rights.
Democratic political criteria have been heavily influencing the policy evolution. Maghreb Arguably to a greater extent than in some other regions, European democracy and human rights policy in the Maghreb has exhibited some degree of convergence between different EU member states and institutions. While the traditional differences between European governments persist in this region, these look less overwhelming today than ten years ago when the Barcelona Process was established.
This cooperation has included a focus on democracy and human rights. The attention given to democracy and human rights under the EMP has slowly become less timid and subject to a greater degree of agreement amongst EU member states, the Commission and the European Parliament. In , the Barcelona Declaration enshrined a formal commitment to encouraging human rights improvements and democratic values.
However, in the intervening years, some genuine convergence has taken place. Against an historical context of major European rivalries and differences in the Maghreb, the absence of fundamental substantive disagreement on general strategic goals now appears significant. On the one hand, the engagement of northern EU member states in southern Mediterranean challenges has undoubtedly intensified. This evolution has represented both cause and effect of the Europeanisation of policy under the EMP.
This change was initially unashamedly tactical: The plethora of committees and dialogue forums responsible for managing the EMP does appear to have helped generate a greater degree of shared understanding around human rights and democratic reform concerns. The routinely asserted problem of poor linkage between different elements of the EU machinery looks less marked under the EMP than in most other areas of European foreign policy.
It was acknowledged that agreement on this strengthened commitment would not have been possible some years previously. The new guidelines reflected notable activism on the part of the European Commission, and particularly of the then-external relations Commissioner, Chris Patten.
Initial support came from the Dutch, Danes, Swedes and British governments, but it was agreed that real significance could be attached to the assent of the French and Spanish governments. France has increasingly seen merit in the pursuit of political reform initiatives in Algeria through the EU dimension; and even Paris has become increasingly exasperated with Tunisian president Bin Ali for resisting any degree of political opening.
Notable similarities have become apparent in the human rights and good governance projects funded by different national donors and the European Commission in the Maghreb. There is a shared agreement on exploring ways of increasing the operationalisation of human rights and democracy strictures through the new Neighbourhood Action Plans, which includes broad agreement on the need to focus efforts more on a country-specific basis in the future.
It is still the case that southern member states remain more cautious on the firm benchmarking of aid and trade benefits against specific reforms, but recent debates over the ENP have revealed a broad willingness on their part to support the basic principle of rewards-based conditionality — certainly to a greater extent than in the past.
While elements of a more unified focus on democracy and human rights have developed in policy towards the Maghreb, there is also a commonality in the advocacy of very gradual political change. On this point, there has been little to distinguish the discourse of one member state from another, or Commissioners Patten and Ferrero-Waldner from Javier Solana, in the last three or four years.
There has been a shared hesitancy on the part of all EU member states and the Commission to engage with Islamist organisations not formally sanctioned by incumbent regimes.
In light of the sensitivities of democracy and human rights promotion in this region, member states have shared a desire to encourage the Commission to take lead role, to a greater degree than in most other areas of EU foreign policy.
This facility, within the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument ENPI , would go beyond the specific support that may be mobilised under regional or national action plan. In , joint UK-Spanish proposals were forthcoming on these issues.
In , the UK joined forces with France, Spain, Portugal and Italy in a project aimed at enhancing the capacity and effectiveness of border guards and patrol vessels in the Mediterranean. During the s, intra-European differences over Libya were one of the most commonly-cited cases of EU strategic disarray.
This appears for the moment to have involved all member states accepting that the prize of progress on non-proliferation with Libya justifies an absence of pressure on internal democratic reform and human rights concerns. Notwithstanding such convergence, differences naturally remain. These can be said to divide along a number of cleavages.
Firstly, geography still plays a causal role. If variation between northern and southern EU member states is not quite as marked as previously, significant differences remain over the tactics advocated to advance human rights and democracy in the Maghreb.