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Editorial Reviews. From Booklist. Harvard professor Nye, who served in the state and defense departments of the Carter and Clinton administrations. The Future of Power [Joseph S. Nye Jr.] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The Future of Power examines what it means to be forceful and . The Future of Power. By Joseph S. Nye, Jr. A Pacific Forum CSIS. L.W. “Bill” and Jean Lane Lecture in Diplomacy. Issues and Insights.

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The Future Of Power Joseph Nye Pdf

Academy Meetings. The Future of Power. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Introduction by Jack Landman Goldsmith. th Stated Meeting, held on February 16, , at the. THE FUTURE OF POWER. Joseph Nye at Central European University. DÓRA ALBERT. It is always an exciting moment when a respected and world-wide. The Future of Power. An address given to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council. On March 28, by. Dr. Joseph Nye. Distinguished Professor of Government.

Skip to main content. Log In Sign Up. Joseph S. Nye Jr. Linda Batoussai. NYE, Jr. Whereas hard power-the ability to coerc ows out of a country's military or economic might, soft power arises from he attractiveness of its culture, political ideals, and policies. Hard power remains crucial in a world of states trying to guard heir independence and of non-state groups willing to turn to violence. But as the Bush administration maps out its foreign policy, Nye emphasizes the importance of nurturing our soft power. It is soft power that will help prevent terrorists from recruiting supporters from among the moderate majority. And it is soft power that will help the United States deal with crit- ical global issues that require multilateral cooperation. America needs to move in a new direction. Isn't it time that we listened to the guidance of one of our foremost foreign policy experts and put his ideas into action? NYE, JR.

We did the same thing in]apan. Army in Washing- ton. One of the other speakers was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

According to a press account, "The top military brass lis- tened sympathetically" to my views, but when someone in the audi- ence later asked Rumsfeld for his opinion on soft power, he replied "I don't know what it means. Some of our leaders do not under- stand the crucial importance of soft power in our reordered post-September 11 world. The real key is how many allies do I grow.

And that is a very important metric that they just don't get. As Osama bin Laden ob- served, people like a strong horse. But power comes in many guises, and soft power is not weakness. It is a form of power, and the failure to incorporate it in our national strategy is a serious mistake.

What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced.

America has long had a great deal of soft power. Think of the impact of Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms in Europe at the end of World War II; of young people behind the Iron Curtain listening to American music and news on Radio Free Europe; of Chinese students symbolizing their protests in Tianan- men Square by creating a replica of the Statue of Liberty; of newly liberated Afghans in asking for a copy of the Bill of Rights; of young Iranians today surreptitiously watching banned American videos and satellite television broadcasts in the privacy of their homes.

These are all examples of America's soft power. When you can get others to admire your ideals and to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Seduction is always more effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual op- portunities are deeply seductive. As General Wesley Clark put it, soft power "gave us an influence far beyond the hard edge of tradi- tional balance-of-power politics.

The United States may be more powerful than any other polity since the Roman Empire, but like Rome, America is neither invinci- ble nor invulnerable. Rome did not succumb to the rise of another empire, but to the onslaught of waves of barbarians. Modern high- tech terrorists are the new barbarians. As the world wends its way deeper into a struggle with terrorism, it becomes increasingly appar- ent that many factors lie outside American control.

Nor can it launch a war when- ever it wishes without alienating other countries and losing the cooperation it needs for winning the peace. The four-week war in Iraq in the spring of was a dazzling display of America's hard military power that removed a tyrant, but it did not resolve our vulnerability to terrorism. It was also costly in terms of our soft power-our ability to attract others to our side.

In the aftermath of the war, polling by the Pew Research Center showed a dramatic decline in the popularity of the United States compared to a year earlier, even in countries like Spain and Italy, whose governments had provided support for the war effort, and America's standing plummeted in Islamic countries from Morocco to Turkey to Southeast Asia.

Yet the United States will need the help of such countries in the long term to track the flow of terrorists, tainted money, and dangerous weapons.

In the words of the Financial Times, "To win the peace, therefore, the US will have to show as much skill in exercising soft power as it has in using hard power to win the war. I pointed out that the United States was the strongest nation not only in military and economic power, but also in a third dimension that I called soft power. In the ensuing years, I have been pleased to see the concept enter the public discourse, used by the American secretary of state, the British foreign minister, po- liticalleaders, and editorial writers as well as academics around the world.

At the same time, however, some have misunderstood it, mis- used and trivialized it as merely the influence of Coca-Cola, Holly- wood, blue jeans, and money. Even more frustrating has been to watch some policy makers ignore the importance of our soft power and make us all pay the price by unnecessarily squandering it.

I returned to soft power in while writing The Paradox of American Power, a book that cautioned against triumphalism, the op- posite error from the declinism I had warned against in Friends and critics urged that if I wanted the term to be properly understood and used in foreign policy, I needed to explore and develop it more fully, and that is the purpose of this book.

This book reflects the fraught international relations that arose before, during, and after the Iraq War. Unlike the Gulf War, when his father built a broad coalition, George W Bush decided to attack Iraq in without a second United Nations resolution and with only a small coalition of supporting countries.

In doing so, he escaped the constraints of alliances and institutions that many in his administration chafed under, but he also produced doubts about the legitimacy of our actions, and widespread anxieties about how the United States would use its preponderant power.

The sharp drop in the attractiveness of the United States around the world made it dif- ficult to recruit support for the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq. Winning the peace is harder than winning a war, and soft power is essential to winning the peace.

Yet the way we went to war in Iraq proved to be as costly for our soft power as it was a stunning victory for our hard power. Readers who are familiar with my earlier work may properly ask what's new here, beyond a discussion of the Iraq War. The answer is "a lot. But here I have honed the definition, expanded the examples, used new polling data and historical research, and explored the implications and limits of soft power in ways I had not done in either of my earlier works.

The first chapter also adds to my analysis of the changing context of power in international politics, and the reasons why soft power is becoming more important than in the past. The second chapter examines the sources of American soft power in our culture, in our domestic values and policies, and in the substance and style of our foreign policy.

Because Americans are not the only ones with soft power, the third chapter looks at the soft power of other nations and nonstate actors. Americans-and others-face an unprecedented challenge from the dark side of globalization and the privatization of war that has accompanied new technologies. This is properly the focus of our new national security strategy, and is sometimes summarized as a war on terrorism.

Like the Cold War, the threats posed by various forms of terrorism will not be resolved quickly, and hard military power will play a vital role. But the U. Like the challenge of the Cold War, this one cannot be met by military power alone.

That is why it is so essential that Americans-and others- better understand and apply soft power. Smart power is neither hard nor soft. It is both. Nye, Jr. I am indebted to a number of people for their contributions. First on any list must be Matthew Kohut, my excellent research assistant who provided valuable ideas and sug- gestions as well as endless streams of data. He was tireless and imag- inative in his efforts. Before going off to graduate school, Alexandra Scacco filled that role with equal vigor and intelligence, and many of her suggestions have made their way into the book.

Neil Rosendorf, her predecessor, did not work directly on this book, but he helped to introduce me to the history of cultural diplomacy and certainly in- fluenced chapters 2 and 4. I am blessed to have had the privilege of working with these wonderful younger colleagues. The cooperation of a number of individuals greatly simplified the research tasks. I am also deeply grateful to my colleagues at the Kennedy School of Government who have provided such a supportive intel- lectual environment for the analysis of policy over the years.

I have drawn a number of ideas from discussions in the multiyear faculty study group on Visions of Governance for the Twenty-first Century. A special category must be re- served for Robert Keohane, my close friend and collaborator for more than three decades.

Not only has he provided careful criticism of the draft chapters, but also I have learned so much from our coau- thorships and conversations over the years that I should grant him one unending footnote for everything I write.

And I am grateful to Kate Darnton for a fine job of intelligent and sensitive editing. As always, my deepest debt is to Molly Harding Nye, a woman with wondrous soft power. But in today's world, it is best to be both. Winning hearts and minds has always been important, but it is even more so in a global information age.

Information is power, and modern in- formation technology is spreading information more widely than ever before in history. Yet political leaders have spent little time thinking about how the nature of power has changed and, more specifically, about how to incorporate the soft dimensions into their strategies for wielding power.

Power is like the weather. Everyone depends on it and talks about it, but few understand it. Just as farmers and meteorologists try to fore- cast the weather, political leaders and analysts try to describe and predict changes in power relationships.

Power is also like love, easier to experience than to define or measure, but no less real for that. The dictionary tells us that power is the capacity to do things. At this most general level, power means the ability to get the outcomes one wants.

So more specifically, power is the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants.

But there are sev- eral ways to affect the behavior of others. You can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want. Some people think of power narrowly, in terms of command and coercion. You experience it when you can make others do what they would otherwise not do.! You say "Jump! This ap- pears to be a simple test of power, but things are not as straightfor- ward as they first appear.

Suppose those whom you command, like my granddaughters, already love to jump? When we measure power in terms of the changed behavior of others, we have first to know their preferences. Otherwise we may be as mistaken about our power as a rooster who thinks his crowing makes the sun rise.

And the power may evaporate when the context changes. The play- ground bully who terrorizes other children and makes them jump at his command loses his power as soon as the class returns from recess to a strict classroom. A cruel dictator can lock up or execute a dissi- dent, but that may not prove his power if the dissenter was really seeking martyrdom. Power always depends on the context in which the relationship exists. What is more, as we shall see, sometimes we can get the outcomes we want by affecting behavior without commanding it.

If you believe that my objectives are legiti- mate, I may be able to persuade you to do something for me without using threats or inducements. It is possible to get many desired out- comes without having much tangible power over others. For exam- ple, some loyal Catholics may follow the pope's teaching on capital punishment not because of a threat of excommunication but out of respect for his moral authority. Or some radical Muslim fundamen- talists may be attracted to support Osama bin Laden's actions not because of payments or threats, but because they believe in the legit- imacy of his objectives.

Thus they turn to a second definition of power and simply define it as the possession of capabilities or resources that can influence outcomes. Consequently they consider a country powerful if it has a relatively large popula- tion and territory, extensive natural resources, economic strength, military force, and social stability.

The virtue of this second defini- tion is that it makes power appear more concrete, measurable, and predictable. But this definition also has problems. When people de- fine power as synonymous with the resources that produce it, they sometimes encounter the paradox that those best endowed with power do not always get the outcomes they want. Power resources are not as fungible as money. What wins in one game may not help at all in another.

Holding a winning poker hand does not help if the game is bridge Even if the game is poker, if you play your high hand poorly, you can still lose. Having power re- sources does not guarantee that you will always get the outcome you want.

For example, in terms of resources the United States was far more powerful than Vietnam, yet we lost the Vietnam War. And America was the world's only superpower in , but we failed to prevent September Converting resources into realized power in the sense of obtain- ing desired outcomes requires well-designed strategies and skillful leadership.

Yet strategies are often inadequate and leaders frequently misjudge-witness Japan and Germany in or Saddam Hussein in As a first approximation in any game, it always helps to start by figuring out who is holding the high cards.

But it is equally im- portant to understand what game you are playing. Which resources provide the best basis for power behavior in a particular context? Oil was not an impressive power resource before the industrial age nor was uranium significant before the nuclear age.

In earlier periods, international power resources may have been easier to assess. A traditional test of a Great Power in international politics was "strength for war. At the end of the Napoleonic Wars in r 8 r 5, Prussia presented its fellow victors at the Congress of Vienna with a precise plan for its own reconstruction with territories and populations to be transferred to maintain a balance of power against France.

In the prenationalist period, it did not matter that many of the people in those transferred provinces did not speak German. However, within half a century popular sentiments of nationalism had grown greatly, and Germany's seizure of Alsace and Lorraine from France in r became one of the underlying causes of World War I. Instead of be- ing assets, the transferred provinces became liabilities in the changed context of nationalism. In short, power resources cannot be judged without knowing the context.

Before you judge who is holding the high cards, you need to understand what game you are playing and how the value of the cards may be changing. For example, the distribution of power resources in the contem- porary information age varies greatly on different issues. We are told that the United States is the only superpower in a "unipolar" world. But the context is far more complex than first meets the eye. The agenda of world politics has become like a three-dimensional chess game in which one can win only by playing vertically as well as horizontally.

On the top board of classic interstate military issues, the United States is indeed the only superpower with global military reach, and it makes sense to speak in traditional terms of unipolarity or hegemony. However, on the middle board of interstate economic issues, the distribution of power is multipolar. The United States cannot obtain the outcomes it wants on trade, antitrust, or financial regulation issues without the agreement of the European Union, Japan, China, and others.

It makes little sense to call this American hegemony. And on the bottom board of transnational issues like ter- rorism, international crime, climate change, and the spread of infec- tious diseases, power is widely distributed and chaotically organized among state and nonstate actors. And this is the set of issues that is now intruding into the world of grand strategy. Yet many political leaders still focus almost entirely on military assets and classic military solu- tions-the top board.

They mistake the necessary for the sufficient. They are one-dimensional players in a three-dimensional game. In the long term, that is the way to lose, since obtaining favorable out- comes on the bottom transnational board often requires the use of soft power assets.

We know that military and economic might often get others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements "carrots" or threats "sticks". But sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without tangible threats or payoffs. The indirect way to get what you want has some- times been called "the second face of power. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions.

This soft power-getting others to want the outcomes that you want-co-opts people rather than coerces them. At the personal level, we are all familiar with the power of attraction and seduction. In a relationship or a marriage, power does not neces- sarily reside with the larger partner, but in the mysterious chemistry of attraction.

And in the business world, smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do what you want. It is difficult to run a large organization by commands alone. You also need to get others to download in to your values.

If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to use carrots or sticks to make you do it. Whereas leaders in authoritarian countries can use coercion and issue commands, politicians in democracies have to rely more on a combination of in- ducement and attraction. Soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, polit- ical values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority.

If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead. Soft power is not merely the same as influence. After all, influ- ence can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments. And soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. Simply put, in behavioral terms soft power is attractive power.

The Future of Power

In terms of resources, soft-power resources are the assets that produce such at- traction. Whether a particular asset is a soft-power resource that produces attraction can be measured by asking people through polls or focus groups. Whether that attraction in turn produces desired policy outcomes has to be judged in particular cases. Attraction does not always determine others' preferences, but this gap between power measured as resources and power judged as the outcomes of behavior is not unique to soft power.

It occurs with all forms of power. Before the fall of France in , Britain and France had more tanks than Germany, but that advantage in military power re- sources did not accurately predict the outcome of the battle. One way to think about the difference between hard and soft power is to consider the variety of ways you can obtain the outcomes you want. You can command me to change my preferences and do what you want by threatening me with force or economic sanctions.

You can restrict my preferences by setting the agenda in such a way that my more extravagant wishes seem too un- realistic to pursue. Or you can appeal to a sense of attraction, love, or duty in our relationship and appeal to our shared values about the justness of contributing to those shared values and purposes. Soft power uses a different type of currency not force, not money to engender cooperation-an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values.

Much as Adam Smith observed that people are led by an in- visible hand when making decisions in a free market, our decisions in the marketplace for ideas are often shaped by soft power-an in- tangible attraction that persuades us to go along with others' pur- poses without any explicit threat or exchange taking place.

Hard and soft power are related because they are both aspects of the ability to achieve one's purpose by affecting the behavior of oth- ers. The distinction between them is one of degree, both in the na- ture of the behavior and in the tangibility of the resources. Command power-the ability to change what others do-can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power-the ability to shape what others want-can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic.

The types ofbehavior between com- mand and co-option range along a spectrum from coercion to eco- nomic inducement to agenda setting to pure attraction. Soft-power resources tend to be associated with the co-optive end of the spec- trum of behavior, whereas hard-power resources are usually associ- ated with command behavior.

But the relationship is imperfect. For example, sometimes countries may be attracted to others with com- mand power by myths of invincibility, and command power may sometimes be used to establish institutions that later become re- garded as legitimate. On the whole, however, the general association between the types of behavior and certain resources is strong enough to allow us to employ the useful shorthand reference to hard- and soft-power resources.

Gov- ernments sometimes find it difficult to control and employ soft power, but that does not diminish its importance. It was a former French foreign minister who observed that the Americans are pow- erful because they can "inspire the dreams and desires of others, thanks to the mastery of global images through film and television and because, for these same reasons, large numbers of students from other countries come to the United States to finish their studies.

Even the great British realist E. Carr, writing in , described international power in three categories: During a meeting with President John F. Kennedy, the senior statesmanJohnJ. I don't believe in world opinion. The only thing that matters is power. As mentioned above, sometimes the same power resources can affect the entire spectrum of behavior from coercion to attraction. A country that suffers economic and military decline is likely to lose not only its hard-power resources but also some of its ability to shape the international agenda and some of its attractiveness.

Some countries may be attracted to others with hard power by the myth of invincibility or inevitability. Both Hitler and Stalin tried to develop such myths. Hard power can also be used to establish empires and institutions that set the agenda for smaller states-witness Soviet rule over the countries of Eastern Europe.

President Kennedy was properly concerned that although polls showed the United States to be more popular, they also showed a Soviet lead in perceptions of its space program and the strength of its nuclear arsenal. The Vatican has soft power despite Stalin's mocking question "How many divisions does the Pope have? Soviet soft power declined even as its hard eco- nomic and military resources continued to grow.

Because of its bru- tal policies, the Soviet Union's hard power actually undercut its soft power. In contrast, the Soviet sphere of influence in Finland was re- inforced by a degree of soft power. Similarly, the United States' sphere of influence in Latin America in the S was reinforced when Franklin Roosevelt added the soft power of his "good neigh- bor policy.

Norwegians say this grows out of their Lutheran missionary her- itage, but at the same time the posture of peacemaker identifies Norway with values shared by other nations that enhance Norway's soft power. Foreign Minister Jan Peterson argued that "we gain some access," explaining that Norway's place at so many negotiating tables elevates its usefulness and value to larger countries.

They need legitimacy. The Polish govern- ment decided to send troops to postwar Iraq not only to curry favor with the United States but also as a way to create a broader positive image of Poland in world affairs.

When the Taliban government fell in Mghanistan in , the Indian foreign minister flew to Kabul to welcome the new interim government in a plane not packed with arms or food but crammed with tapes of Bollywood movies and mu- sic, which were quickly distributed across the city. Institutions can enhance a country's soft power. For example, Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the sec- ond half of the twentieth century advanced their values by creating a structure of international rules and institutions that were consistent with the liberal and democratic nature of the British and American economic systems: When countries make their power legitimate in the eyes of others, they encounter less resistance to their wishes.

If a country's culture and ideology are attractive, others more willingly follow. If it uses institutions and follows rules that encourage other countries to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it will not need as many costly carrots and sticks. Let's start with culture. Culture is the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society. It has many manifestations. It is common to distinguish between high culture such as literature, art, and education, which appeals to elites, and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment.

When a country's culture includes universal values and its poli- cies promote values and interests that others share, it increases the probability of obtaining its desired outcomes because of the rela- tionships of attraction and duty that it creates. Narrow values and parochial cultures are less likely to produce soft power.

The United States benefits from a universalistic culture. The German editor Josef Joffe once argued that America's soft power was even larger than its economic and military assets. Rome's and Soviet Russia's cultural sway stopped exactly at their military borders. America's soft power, though, rules over an empire on which the sun never sets. They make the mistake of equating soft power behavior with the cultural resources that sometimes help produce it.

They confuse the cultural resources with the behavior of attraction. The North Korean dictator KimJong 11 is alleged to like pizza and American videos, but that does not affect his nu- clear programs. Excellent wines and cheeses do not guarantee at- traction to France, nor does the popularity of Pokemon games assure that Japan will get the policy outcomes it wishes.

This is not to deny that popular culture is often a resource that produces soft power, but as we saw earlier, the effectiveness of any power resource depends on the context.

Tanks are not a great mili- tary power resource in swamps or jungles. Coal and steel are not major power resources if a country lacks an industrial base. Serbs eating at McDonald's supported Milosevic, and Rwandans commit- ted atrocities while wearing T-shirts with American logos. American films that make the United States attractive in China or Latin Amer- ica may have the opposite effect and actually reduce American soft power in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. But in general, polls show that our popular culture has made the United States seem to others "ex- citing, exotic, rich, powerful, trend-setting-the cutting edge of modernity and innovation.

So now we think it's only natural to go to court a few times in your life. As we will see in the next chapter, the background attraction and repulsion of American popular culture in different regions and among different groups may make it easier or more difficult for American officials to promote their policies.

In China, the attraction and rejection of American culture among different groups may cancel each other out. Commerce is only one of the ways in which culture is transmit- ted.

It also occurs through personal contacts, visits, and exchanges. The ideas and values that America exports in the minds of more than half a million foreign students who study every year in Ameri- can universities and then return to their home countries, or in the minds of the Asian entrepreneurs who return home after succeeding in Silicon Valley, tend to reach elites with power. Most of China's leaders have a son or daughter educated in the States who can por- tray a realistic view of the United States that is often at odds with the caricatures in official Chinese propaganda.

Similarly, when the United States was trying to persuade President Musharraf of Pak- istan to change his policies and be more supportive of American measures in Afghanistan, it probably helped that he could hear from a son working in the Boston area.

Government policies at home and abroad are another potential source of soft power. For example, in the S racial segregation at home undercut American soft power in Africa, and today the prac- tice of capital punishment and weak gun control laws undercut American soft power in Europe.

Similarly, foreign policies strongly affect soft power. Jimmy Carter's human rights policies are a case in point, as were government efforts to promote democracy in the Reagan and Clinton administrations. In Argentina, American hu- man rights policies that were rejected by the military government of the S produced considerable soft power for the United States two decades later, when the Peronists who were earlier imprisoned subsequently came to power.

Policies can have long-term as well as short-term effects that vary as the context changes. The popularity of the United States in Argentina in the early S reflected Carter's policies of the s, and it led the Argentine government to support American policies in the UN and in the Balkans.

Government policies can reinforce or squander a country's soft power. Domestic or foreign policies that appear to be hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to the opinion of others, or based on a narrow approach to national interests can undermine soft power. For exam- ple, in the steep decline in the attractiveness of the United States as measured by polls taken after the Iraq War in , people with un- favorable views for the most part said they were reacting to the Bush administration and its policies rather than the United States gener- ally.

So far, they distinguish American people and culture from American policies. The publics in most nations continued to admire the United States for its technology, music, movies, and television. But large majorities in most countries said they disliked the growing influence of America in their country. As we will see in the next chapter, three decades ago, many people around the world objected to America's war in Vietnam, and the standing of the United States reflected the unpopularity of that policy.

When the policy changed and the mem- ories of the war receded, the United States recovered much of its lost soft power. Whether the same thing will happen in the aftermath of the Iraq War will depend on the success of policies in Iraq, develop- ments in the Israel-Palestine conflict, and many other factors.

The values a government champions in its behavior at home for example, democracy , in international institutions working with others , and in foreign policy promoting peace and human rights strongly affect the preferences of others. Governments can attract or repel others by the influence of their example. But soft power does not belong to the government in the same degree that hard power does.

Some hard-power assets such as armed forces are strictly gov- ernmental; others are inherently national, such as oil and mineral re- serves, and many can be transferred to collective control, such as the civilian air fleet that can be mobilized in an emergency.

In the Vietnam era, for example, American popular culture often worked at cross- purposes to official government policy. Today, Hollywood movies that show scantily clad women with libertine attitudes or fundamen- talist Christian groups that castigate Islam as an evil religion are both properly outside the control of government in a liberal soci- ety, but they undercut government efforts to improve relations with Islamic nations.

In their view, imitation or attraction are simply that, not power. As we have seen, some imitation or attraction does not produce much power over policy outcomes, and neither does imitation always produce de- sirable outcomes. For example, in the Is, Japan was widely ad- mired for its innovative industrial processes, but imitation by companies in other countries came back to haunt the Japanese when it reduced their market power. Similarly, armies frequently imitate and therefore nullify the successful tactics of their opponents and make it more difficult for them to achieve the outcomes they want.

Such observations are correct, but they miss the point that exerting attraction on others often does allow you to get what you want. The skeptics who want to define power only as deliberate acts of com- mand and control are ignoring the second, or "structural," face of power-the ability to get the outcomes you want without having to force people to change their behavior through threats or payments.

At the same time, it is important to specify the conditions under which attraction is more likely to lead to desired outcomes, and un- der which it will not. All power depends on context-who relates to whom under what circumstances-but soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and re- ceivers.

Moreover, attraction often has a diffuse effect, creating gen- eral influence rather than producing an easily observable specific action. Just as money can be invested, politicians speak of storing up political capital to be drawn on in future circumstances.

Of course, such goodwill may not ultimately be honored, and diffuse reciproc- ity is less tangible than an immediate exchange. Nonetheless, the in- direct effects of attraction and a diffuse influence can make a significant difference in obtaining favorable outcomes in bargaining situations. Otherwise leaders would insist only on immediate payoffs and specific reciprocity, and we know that is not always the way they behave.

Social psychologists have developed a substantial body of empirical research exploring the relationship between attractiveness and power. A dictator cannot be totally indifferent to the views of the people in his coun- try, but he can often ignore whether another country is popular or not when he calculates whether it is in his interests to be helpful.

In democracies where public opinion and parliaments matter, political leaders have less leeway to adopt tactics and strike deals than in au- tocracies. Thus it was impossible for the Turkish government to permit the transport of American troops across the country in because American policies had greatly reduced our popularity in public opinion and in the parliament. In contrast, it was far easier for the United States to obtain the use of bases in authoritarian Uzbekistan for operations in Mghanistan.

Finally, though soft power sometimes has direct effects on spe- cific goals-witness the inability of the United States to obtain the votes of Chile or Mexico in the UN Security Council in after our policies reduced our popularity-it is more likely to have an im- pact on the general goals that a country seeks. If one considers various American national interests, for example, soft power may be less rele- vant than hard power in preventing attack, policing borders, and pro- tecting allies.

But soft power is particularly relevant to the realization of "milieu goals. It is easier to attract people to democracy than to coerce them to be democratic. The fact that the impact of attraction on achieving preferred outcomes varies by con- text and type of goals does not make it irrelevant, any more than the fact that bombs and bayonets do not help when we seek to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, slow global warming, or create democracy.

Other skeptics object to using the term "soft power" in interna- tional politics because governments are not in full control of the at- traction.

But the fact that civil society is the origin of much soft power does not disprove its existence. In a liberal society, government cannot and should not control the culture.

Indeed, the absence of policies of control can it- self be a source of attraction. The Czech film director Milos Forman recounts that when the Communist government let in the American film Twelve Angry Men because of its harsh portrait of American in- stitutions, Czech intellectuals responded by thinking, "If that coun- try can make this kind of thing, films about itself, oh, that country must have a pride and must have an inner strength, and must be strong enough and must be free.

That is all the more reason for governments to make sure that their own actions and policies reinforce rather than undercut their soft power. And this is particularly true since private sources of soft power are likely to be- come increasingly important in the global information age.

Of course, one must be careful not to read too much into opinion polls. They are an essential but imperfect measure of soft-power resources because an- swers vary depending on the way that questions are formulated, and unless the same questions are asked consistently over some period, they represent snapshots rather than a continuous picture. Opinions can change, and such volatility cannot be captured by anyone poll.

Moreover, political leaders must often make unpopular decisions be- cause they are the right thing to do, and hope that their popularity may be repaired if the decision is subsequently proved correct.

Pop- ularity is not an end in itself in foreign policy. Nonetheless, polls are a good first approximation of both how attractive a country appears and the costs that are incurred by unpopular policies, particularly when they show consistency across polls and over time.

And as we shall see in the next chapter, that attractiveness can have an effect on our ability to obtain the outcomes we want in the world. With the advent of the nuclear age, the United States and the Soviet Union possessed not only in- dustrial might but nuclear arsenals and intercontinental missiles.

The age of the superpowers had begun. Subsequently, the leading role of the United States in the information revolution near the end of the century allowed it to create a revolution in military affairs. The ability to use information technology to create precision weapons, real-time intelligence, broad surveillance of regional bat- tlefields, and improved command and control allowed the United States to surge ahead as the world's only military superpower.

But the progress of science and technology had contradictory ef- fects on military power over the past century. Paradoxically, nuclear weapons were acceptable for deterrence, but they proved so awesome and destructive that they became muscle- bound-too costly to use in war except, theoretically, in the most ex- treme circumstances. A second important change was the way that modern communi- cations technology fomented the rise and spread of nationalism, which made it more difficult for empires to rule over socially awak- ened populations.

In the nineteenth century, Britain ruled a quarter of the globe with a tiny fraction of the world's population. As nation- alism grew, colonial rule became too expensive and the British em- pire collapsed. Formal empires with direct rule over subject populations such as Europe exercised during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are simply too costly in the twenty-first century.

In addition to nuclear and communications technology, social changes inside the large democracies also raised the costs of using military power. Postindustrial democracies are focused on welfare rather than glory, and they dislike high casualties. This does not mean that they will not use force, even when casualties are ex- pected-witness Britain, France, and the United States in the Gulf War, and Britain and the United States in the Iraq War.

But the absence of a prevailing warrior ethic in modern democracies means that the use of force requires an elaborate moral justification to ensure popular support, unless actual survival is at stake. For ad- vanced democracies, war remains possible, but it is much less ac- ceptable than it was a century, or even a half century, ago.

Nonetheless, the success of the European countries in creating an island of peace on the continent that had been ravaged by three Franco-German wars in less than a century may predispose them toward more peaceful solutions to conflict. However, in a global economy even the United States must con- sider how the use of force might jeopardize its economic objectives. Mter its victory in World War II the United States helped to re- structure Japan's economy, but it is hard to imagine that the United States today could effectively threaten force to open Japanese mar- kets or change the value of the yen.

Nor can one easily imagine the United States using force to resolve disputes with Canada or Eu- rope. Unlike earlier periods, islands of peace where the use of force is no longer an option in relations among states have come to char- acterize relations among most modern liberal democracies, and not just in Europe. The existence of such islands of peace is evidence of the increasing importance of soft power where there are shared val- ues about what constitutes acceptable behavior among similar dem- ocratic states.

In their relations with each other, all advanced democracies are from Venus. Even nondemocratic countries that feel fewer popular moral constraints on the use of force have to consider its effects on their economic objectives.

War risks deterring investors who control flows of capital in a globalized economy. As two RAND analysts argue, "In the information age, 'cooperative' advantages will become increasingly important. Moreover, societies that improve their abilities to cooperate with friends and allies may also gain competitive advantages against rivals. On the contrary, the information revolu- tion has yet to transform most of the world, and many states are unconstrained by democratic societal forces.

Civil wars are rife in many parts of the world where collapsed empires left failed states and power vacuums. Even more important is the way in which the democratization of technology is leading to the privatization of war. Technology is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, technologi- cal and social changes are making war more costly for modern democracies.

But at the same time, technology is putting new means of destruction into the hands of extremist groups and individuals. It is a long-standing method of conflict frequently defined as deliberate attack on non- combatants with the objective of spreading fear and intimidation.

Already a century ago, the novelistJoseph Conrad had drawn an in- delible portrait of the terrorist mind, and terrorism was a familiar phenomenon in the twentieth century. It occurred on every continent except Antarctica and affected nearly every country. September Il, , was a dramatic escalation of an age-old phenomenon. Yet two developments have made terrorism more lethal and more difficult to manage in the twenty-first century.

One set of trends grows out of progress in science and technol- ogy. First, there is the complex, highly technological nature of mod- ern civilization's basic systems. But some though not all systems become more vulner- able and fragile as they become more complex and efficient.

Where bombs and timers were once heavy and expensive, plastic ex- plosives and digital timers are light and cheap. The costs of hijack- ing an airplane are sometimes little more than the price of a ticket. In addition, the success of the information revolution is provid- ing inexpensive means of communication and organization that al- low groups once restricted to local and national police jurisdictions to become global in scope.

Thirty years ago, instantaneous global communication was sufficiently expensive that it was restricted to large entities with big budgets like governments, multinational cor- porations, or the Roman Catholic church. Today the Internet makes global communication virtually free for anyone with access to a mo- dem. Terrorists also depend on getting their messages out quickly to a broad audience through mass media and the Inter- net-witness the widespread dissemination of bin Laden's television interviews and videotapes after September I I.

Terrorism depends crucially on soft power for its ultimate victory. It depends on its abil- ity to attract support from the crowd at least as much as its ability to destroy the enemy's will to fight.

The second set of trends reflects changes in the motivation and organization of terrorist groups. Terrorists in the mid-twentieth century tended to have relatively well-defined political objectives, which were often ill served by mass destruction.

They were said to want many people watching rather than many people killed. Such terrorists were often supported and covertly controlled by govern- ments such as Libya or Syria. Toward the end of the century, radical groups grew on the fringes of several religions.

There they were trained in a wide range of techniques, and many were recruited to organizations with an extreme view of the religious obligation of ji- had. As the historian WaIter Laquer has observed, "Traditional ter- rorists, whether left-wing, right-wing, or nationalist-separatists, were not greatly drawn to these opportunities for greater destruc- tion Terrorism has become more brutal and indiscriminate since then.

Fortunately, unlike communism and fascism, Islamist ideology has failed to attract a wide following outside the Islamic community, but that community provides a large pool of over a billion people from which to recruit. Organization has also changed. For example, AI Qaeda's network of thousands of peo- ple in loosely affiliated cells in some 60 countries gives it a scale well beyond anything seen before. But even small networks can be more difficult to penetrate than the hierarchical quasi-military organiza- tions of the past.

Both trends, technological and ideological, have created a new set of conditions that have increased both the lethality of terrorism and the difficulty of managing terrorism today.

Because of Septem- ber I I and the unprecedented scale of AI Qaeda, the current focus is properly on terrorism associated with Islamic extremists.

But it would be a mistake to limit our attention or responses to Islamic ter- rorists, for that would be to ignore the wider effects of the democra- tization of technology and the broader set of challenges that must be met.

Technological progress is putting into the hands of deviant groups and individuals destructive capabilities that were once lim- ited primarily to governments and armies. Every large group of peo- ple has some members who deviate from the norm, and some who are bent on destruction.

It is worth remembering that the worst ter- rorist act in the United States before September I I was the one committed by Timothy McVeigh, a purely home grown antigovern- ment fanatic.

Even if the current wave of Islamic terrorism turns out to be genera- tional or cyclical, like terrorist waves in the past, the world will still have to confront the long-term secular dangers arising out of the de- mocratization of technology.

Lethality has been increasing. In the S, the Palestinian at- tack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics or the killings by the Red Brigades that galvanized world attention cost dozens of lives. In the s, Sikh extremists bombed an Air India flight and killed over people.

September II, , cost several thousand lives- and all of this escalation occurred without the use of weapons of mass destruction. If one extrapolates this lethality trend and imag- ines a deviant group in some society gaining access to biological or nuclear materials within the coming decade, it is possible to imagine terrorists being able to destroy millions of lives. In the twentieth century, a pathological individual like Hitler or Stalin or Pol Pot required the apparatus of a totalitarian government to kill large numbers of people.

Unfortunately, it is now all too easy to envisage extremist groups and individuals killing millions without the instruments of governments. This is truly the "privatization of war," and it represents a dramatic change in world politics. More- over, this next step in the escalation of terrorism could have pro- found effects on the nature of our urban civilization.

What will happen to the willingness of people to locate in cities, to our ability to sustain cultural institutions, if instead of destroying two office buildings, a future attack destroys the lower half of Manhattan, the City area of London, or the Left Bank of Paris? The new terrorism is not like the S terrorism of the IRA, the ETA the military wing of the Basque separatist movement , or Italy's Red Brigades, nor is the vulnerability limited to anyone soci- ety.

A "business as usual" attitude toward curbing terrorism is not enough. Force still plays a role in world politics, but its nature has changed in the twenty-first century.

As we will see in chapter 3, many terrorists groups also have soft as well as hard power. The United States was correct in altering its national security strategy to focus on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction after September II, But the means the Bush administration chose focused too heavily on hard power and did not take enough account of soft power.

And that is a mistake, because it is through soft power that terrorists gain general support as well as new recruits. A country that courts popularity may be loath to ex- ercise its hard power when it should, but a country that throws its weight around without regard to the effects on its soft power may find others placing obstacles in the way of its hard power.

No coun- try likes to feel manipulated, even by soft power. At the same time, as mentioned earlier, hard power can create myths of invincibility or inevitability that attract others. Kennedy went ahead with nuclear testing despite negative polls because he worried about global perceptions of Soviet gains in the arms race. Kennedy "was willing to sacrifice some of America's 'soft' prestige in return for gains in the harder currency of military prestige.

As one designer put it, American symbols "are still the strongest security blanket. Information once reserved for the government is now available for mass consumption. The Internet has literally put power at the fingertips of nonstate agents, allowing them to launch cyberattacks from their homes. The cyberage has created a new power frontier among states, ripe with opportunity for developing countries.

To remain at the pinnacle of world power, the United States must adopt a strategy that designed for a global information age. Read more Read less. Discover Prime Book Box for Kids. Learn more. Frequently bought together. Total price: Add all three to Cart Add all three to List. One of these items ships sooner than the other. Show details. download the selected items together This item: The Future of Power by Joseph S. Nye Jr. Ships from and sold by site. Soft Power: Customers who bought this item also bought.

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John J. Power Rules: Leslie H. World Order. Henry Kissinger. Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. Human Security in a Borderless World. Derek S. Review "Excellent Read more. Product details Paperback: PublicAffairs; Reprint edition December 13, Language: English ISBN Start reading The Future of Power on your Kindle in under a minute.

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Don't have a Kindle? Try the Kindle edition and experience these great reading features: Share your thoughts with other customers. Write a customer review. Read reviews that mention soft power united states smart power joseph nye hard power foreign policy future of power american power twenty-first century climate change power transition military power power works global power give this book power politics nye explains power into smart understanding of power book on the future.

Top Reviews Most recent Top Reviews. There was a problem filtering reviews right now. Please try again later. Hardcover Verified download. The key idea of this book is conversion strategies and smart power. While this is simple enough it is a worthwhile read in grasping some takes on post cold war power politics. He understands the strength of "soft power" Paperback Verified download. Joseph Nye is a brilliant thinker.

He understands the strength of "soft power" to combat terrorism, as no one else seems to grasp. His voice must be heard in order to avert disaster in the near future. Yet it would seem his is a "cry in the wilderness.

Kindle Edition Verified download. A great book that will help you understand smart power or the balance of persuasion and force in an effort to lead the United States into the future.

Excellent Item and Fast Shipping! If you are interested in global politics then this is a timely and important book. Nye gives many persuasive historical examples to support his general theme. He speaks convincingly about the importance of soft power, his main interest. However, he balances this with numerous examples where soft power has not worked and will not work in the future.

The Future of Power is not a page turner, but Nye's work displays a deep understanding of how power works globaly. Few other authors posses such a comprehensive view into the mechanics of word power.