Practices of Looking Sturken Marita and Cartwright Lisa - Ebook download as PDF File .pdf) or view presentation slides online. Practices of Looking. An Introduction to Visual Culture. Second Edition. Marita Sturken and Lisa Cartwright. New York. Oxford. OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. Request PDF on ResearchGate | On Jan 1, , Marita Sturken and others published Practices of Looking: An Introduction to Visual Culture.
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Practices of Looking: Images, Power, and Politics. 2. Viewers Make Meaning. 3. Spectatorship, Power and Knowledge. 4. Reproduction and Visual. ulture and looking practices. One challenge came from the French Marxist theorist Louis Althusser in the s. He insisted that ideology cannot be dis-. Trove: Find and get Australian resources. Books, images, historic newspapers, maps, archives and more.
Though this study does constitute an attempt at applying such approaches to a specific time and place — Madrid in the latter decades of the nineteenth-century — it must be noted that the act of seeing the city and seeing in the city were fundamental aspects of the urban experience in the nineteenth-century9. The complex dialectic between the past and the present, felt not only in Madrid but in other European capitals as well, was played out on the pages of the illustrated press.
Published prints exemplify the links and tensions between representations of space and uses of space, between urban identities and the images that resulted from transformation. Though those depictions in the style of costumbrismo imply a rethinking or an appropriation of the past, they also fit within a broader discourse of modernity that is clearly formulated in illustrated magazines.
Larson, E. Related Papers. We use our discussion of Masked Woman in a Wheelchair to suggest a different relationship to practices of shame and looking, emphasizing the controlling function of the mask relative to the potential for a different sort of empathetic identification, which we will develop later in this article with regard to this photograph.
Second, shame is constitutive of social identity and being in the world in a fundamental way that the other affects are not. To approach the sentiment of shame as something to be excised or replaced by other sentiments pride, for example would be to miss something fundamental about the nature of sociality and political identity. Shame is at the basis of a set of intersubjective, empathetic processes of identification that are constitutive of both an individual sense of being and a sense of community and belonging in the world.
This point, which we will develop with reference to the writings of Silvan Tomkins, is central to our discussion about looking and identification with others in the social politics of disability articulated below.
As the sentiment of being a political subject, shame involves desire for and experience of proximity with others, even as it poses barriers to mutuality and threats to identification with others, as we see performed in the act of looking away described earlier. Shame harbors a paradox: enacted through a turning away of the look, it is at the same time constitutive of sociality.
For Tomkins, whereas contempt strengthens the boundaries between individuals and groups, undercutting the potential for community, shared shame is a prime instrument in the strengthening of social bonds and mutuality. For this reason, we see shame neither as a negative sentiment to be unlearned nor exactly as a structure as Agamben calls it through which the subject is constituted.
Rather, we regard shame as a set of intersubjective practices through which subjectivity takes its forms in communities of experience, of which the disability studies classroom is one. The enactment of shame practices intersubjectively is a necessary area of study if we are to move forward with the work of understanding disability politics and looking in ways that stress the psychic aspects of social interaction, and not the inner experience of the unitary spectator.
Finally, shame is practiced through looking in a manner that the other affects are not, and in ways that are fundamental to experiences of empathy and identification. According to both Tomkins and Agamben, shame bears a unique relationship to sight and the visual field. The extensive work on shame by Tomkins is filled with references to the enactment of shame in practices of looking.
For example, in the classic repose of shame, looking is brought in check: the shamed subject hangs its head, eyes cast down.
In becoming ashamed the subject may look down or away, but in shaming another, one may stare, and in doing so eliciting a physical, visible response in the body of the one who is the object of the stare: a blush Tomkins, —56; Wilson, Likewise, the look of the photograph may elicit similar displays of shame in the bodies of spectators, as we have described earlier. Moreover, in this example provided by Tompkins I would harbor within my mind a third, internalized self that hangs its head in shame.
Even more to the point about shame and visuality: for Tomkins, a taboo on looking is fundamental to shame practices pp. He cites the mythical example of the shame that ensues from the breaking of this taboo on looking by the mother of Hector, who calls her son to look upon her bare chest, demanding him to feel aidos reverence, shame at the sight.
Like the student confronted by the unsettling photograph, the son is rendered speechless that is, temporarily without the ability to actively look at the very moment that he is called upon to look and respond p.
Rather than proposing the proud or respectful look back, or the respectful look away, as possible resolutions of the shamed look, we suggest an interpretation of the photograph in question and its play on viewers that emphasizes the performative and the constructed nature of disability representation as political masquerade.
To do this, we go further with the concept of shame as social practice, drawing together the points introduced earlier: shame as constitutive of social being in the world; and the place of looking in the identity-constitutive and sociality-constitutive emotional practices of shame and dignity.
We conclude with an analysis of Masked Woman in a Wheelchair that suggests some ways in which this photograph functions as an elicitor of particular relationships and practices of shame.
Shame, Sociality and Visuality Darwin regarded shame and guilt as distinguishable from other emotions by their eliciting events. Whereas Darwin considered shame in its evolutionary context, Tomkins considered empirical evidence of shame and its status as a social and intersubjective emotion. He studied shame through observation of the performance of bodies engaged in practices of shaming and being shamed in the visual field.
For Tomkins, shame is linked to the problematic of human suffering. It is thus that in the development of a larger, comprehensive theory of affect as a means to understanding the human condition, Tomkins spent considerable time on shame. For Tomkins , shame operates in direct relationship to pleasure, interest and enjoyment. Shame, in his account, is An innate auxiliary affect and a specific inhibitor of continuing interest and enjoyment.
Like disgust, it operates ordinarily only after interest or enjoyment has been activated, and inhibits one or the other or both.
The innate activator of shame is the incomplete reduction of interest or joy. This understanding of shame contains a number of important elements for our purposes here. To begin, shame arises when there is interest. Shame is intersubjectively performed, in communicative acts.
What this suggests is that shame provides the generative conditions for sociality. When one is ashamed of the other, that other is not only forced into shame but he is also reminded that the other is sufficiently concerned positively as well as negatively to feel ashamed of and for the other. We emphasize the sociality of shame as it can and must function in a positive manner to forge mutuality in social groups and in learning.
We propose that shame is a necessary and unavoidable dynamic in classroom dynamics, as well as in movement and identity politics. Tomkins offers many descriptions of the production of shame that situate this affect squarely within a framework of prohibition or repression in response 8 journal of visual culture 5 2 to an external elicitor.
An empirical psychologist, Tomkins worked by way of observation and description. His ideas were developed in part through descriptive vignettes. The short narratives of shaming practices laced throughout his writings provide rich documentation of the movement of shame as an intersubjective social practice rather than as a private feeling harbored within the solitary subject.
Shame, in the writings of Tomkins, is articulated through descriptions of material interactions among bodies and objects. In most of these accounts, this person is a parent or a teacher who feels or elicits shame in a child.
For our purposes, the elicitor we wish to emphasize is not another individual but a photograph, even as we recognize that the teacher and teaching assistant are present in the scenario just described. We propose that the elicitor need not harbor intentionality or consciousness to perform in a manner that can provoke a shame response in its spectators.
The Althusserian concept of interpellation so broadly developed in visual theory is based in precisely this point.
Previous work on spectatorship has emphasized the relationship of interpellation to pleasure in looking. Shame is connected in important ways to pleasure in looking — or, more precisely, to the interruption of the circuit of pleasure. The production of enjoyment in viewers is probably among the most commonly shared functions that we ascribe to photographs and films in discussions of viewing practices studied in academic contexts. We argue that the reaction we observe following the projection of the Arbus photograph in the story at the beginning of this article is due initially to surprise, an affect of recalibration, and in some cases also the sort of inhibition of enjoyment that Tomkins describes as a feature of the shame process.
He describes shame as the result of the interruption of excitement or enjoyment in the subject by the eliciting entity, rather than identifying shame itself as the causal factor.
Following from this, we return to the classroom scenario with which we opened this article.
We proposed Cartwright and Benin Shame and empathy 9 that the stopped moment we witnessed in the classroom when students looked for the first time at Masked Woman in a Wheelchair was the moment in which the image, as elicitor, confronted, arrested and interrupted desire in the viewer. The photograph, in our shame narrative, is the active elicitor — even, as we will discuss later, as the woman in the wheelchair looks through a mask that covers over and makes uncertain the fact of her look.
As an act observed in the visual field, looking away in shame can trigger empathetic shame in the other who witnesses that act.
Looking away is an important moment in social shame, a moment that establishes a space of private contemplation that is also, importantly, shared like silent prayer in a field of intersubjective practice in which we all look inward in contemplation, or away as if out of respect to something that we imagine to hold a status beyond that which we may look upon.
In the group practice of inward looking we find a collective reverence for the sanctity of the object of the look that borders on fear. As in the example of Hector being called by his mother to look upon her bare breast, there can also be an element of taboo pleasure grounding this kind of looking away that is situated between shame and the conferral of dignity upon the object of the look.
Hector is struck silent because he is startled by the overload of a sight that offers a morally unsanctioned pleasures, a sight he may find pleasurable not only against his own better judgment, but precisely because it is off limits to look.
The response of some viewers of Masked Woman in a Wheelchair to look away suggests that the photograph has been imagined to demand privacy for itself even as it hails spectators with its outrageous masked face. It also circulates through the awareness of 10 journal of visual culture 5 2 being one among a group of those who look intently, and in so doing are compelled to look away. It is this social field, the shared practice of looking away, and also the subsequent sharing of covert or vulnerable looks among students and teachers before we reorganize around image analysis through talk, that constitutes an active social space of looking organized around the image whose look we avoid.
How does this differ from the ideas of a prohibition or a repression of the look? As with the example of Hector repeated earlier, interruption of enjoyment suggests prohibition of the look by some external social force that invokes a taboo against sexualized looking, for example , or repression the look is repressed within the individual, within the social context in response to imagined social regulations.
In this model, something else, something negative shame issues forth as the result of prohibition or repression. We wish to move this model away from the negative—positive binary, while still retaining the component of sexual looking to which we will return at the end of this article. What is blocked, we propose, is not pleasure per se, but the ability to identify in the strict sense. Shame is strongly linked to pity and compassion responses, we suggest, because the shame process circumvents identification with the body represented.
Pity and compassion are the active issues of shame. They are key sources of the many pleasures that the shame experience has to offer. SlideShare Explore Search You. Submit Search. Successfully reported this slideshow. We use your LinkedIn profile and activity data to personalize ads and to show you more relevant ads.
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