Flying off Course Third editionThe airline industry presents an enigma: high growth rates during the last forty years 1MB Size Report. DOWNLOAD PDF. FLYING OFF COURSE 3competitors on long-haul routes. It is this factor which makes 4 CHARACTERISTICS AND TRENDS IN AIRLINE. Book review: Flying Off Course – Airline Economics and Marketing — April Download PDF. Text. Professor Doganis has produced the fourth edition of his.
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medical-site.info You have full access to read online and download this title. DownloadPDF MB Read online. In the years since the first edition of Flying Off Course appeared, the international airline industry has DownloadPDF MB Read online. PDF read Flying Off Course: The Economics of International Airlines Full Popular - by Rigas Doganis. Flying Off Course: The Economics of International Airlines.
It is partlyexplained by some of the problems facing the industry recently. That recession coincided with the easing ofmany of the economic regulations and controls on air services.
Thishappened most dramatically and rapidly in the United States from onwards But many other states alsocaught the bug. Liberalization has affected most of the major international airmarkets.
Its effects even spilled over into countries that viewed deregulation withdisfavour. While coping with these external difficulties the international airlineindustry was itself undergoing structural changes.
The late s onwards saw adramatic growth in the charter services, particularly within Europe and on theNorth Atlantic, and the emergence of large but low-cost charter airlines.
Whilethe growth of charters on transatlantic routes was stemmed and reversed as aresult of liberalization of scheduled services, this has not happened with intra-European charter services. Equally worrying for the established scheduledcarriers was the emergence during the latter part of this period of new dynamicand low-cost airlines in some Third World countries, notably in South East Asia.
The East Asian carriers rapidly captured a growing share of the long-haulmarkets to and from the Pacific rim.
After the economic fortunes of the international airline industryimproved significantly and for two or three years profits shot up. This marketturn-round was due essentially to two external factors—a fall in the real price ofaviation fuel and a sudden acceleration in the demand for air services. The surgein demand caught most airlines unawares and short of capacity. Load factorswent up and this pushed profits up too. However, by some of the majorairlines were beginning to look less healthy again.
Moreover in the period —94 a huge number of aircraft about 1, in all ordered when growth rates hadpicked up after were due to be delivered. Would the airlines be able togenerate sufficient demand to fill these aircraft? Or, as in previous decades,would a surge in new capacity lead to a collapse of profit margins?
Furtheruncertainty was created by the Gulf War which broke out in January But, for the individual airline, financial success depends on matching supply anddemand in a way which is both efficient and profitable. This is the underlyingtheme and focus of the book. While airline managements have considerablecontrol over the supply of air services, they have relatively little control over thedemand. Hence the matching process is not an easy one.
To help inunderstanding the process the present book provides a practical insight into keyaspects of airline operations and planning within the conceptional framework ofeconomics. The book works through the issues logically. Thoseconstraints have been loosened on international routes to and from the UnitedStates following deregulation and are in the process of being eroded in Europe Chapters 3 and 4.
To match the supply of air services with the demandsuccessfully it is essential to understand both airline costs and the factors thataffect them Chapters 5 and 6 and the nature of the demand. Understanding A thoroughappreciation of demand must also be used to develop traffic and other forecasts,since every activity within an airline ultimately stems from a forecast Chapter 9.
Supply and demand are brought together in a number of ways butmost crucially through effective product planning Chapter Price is a keyelement of the airline product or service. Alternative airline pricing policies andstrategies need careful consideration Chapter While the emphasisthroughout is on scheduled operations, a large part of international air transportis now provided by charter or non-scheduled services. The particularcharacteristics and advantages of such services require special attention Chapter 7 , as do certain aspects of air freight Chapter The book beginswith the theme of this introduction.
It examines the underlying trends in theairline industry, including its rapid technological change, the high growth ratesand the marginal profitability. Only for the airlines ofa few large countries such as the USA, the Soviet Union, Brazil and China aredomestic operations of greater significance than international. The airlines of most other countries mainly run international airservices, while several of them operate only internationally.
The US domestic airline industry has clearly undergone rapid and far-reachingchanges since it was deregulated in Numerous articles, papers and bookshave analysed and considered the implications of those changes for example,Button, It is for this reason that the present book does not deal directlywith US domestic deregulation except where it impinges on international airlineoperations. There is no magic wand to ensure success within the international airlineindustry.
This book attempts to flesh out the economic and operational issueswhich must be understood in order to match supply and demand. Only when thishas been done can there be some measure of success in this most dynamic ofindustries. So come, fly with me. Flying off Course The only comparable innovations elsewherehave been the emergence of the supertankers in shipping and the development ofhigh-speed trains, though the impact of the latter is still only marginal.
Innovation in aviation has centred on the development of the jet engine for civiluse, first in a turbo propeller form and later as a pure jet. Successivedevelopments in the jet engine have consistently improved its efficiency andpropulsive power.
The emergence of larger and more powerful engines inassociation with improvements in airframe design and in control systems hasresulted in successive improvements in aircraft speed and size. Higher speedsand larger aircraft have in turn produced significant jumps in aircraftproductivity. This is evident in Table 1. Even in the era of the piston engine,dramatic improvements were made, so that the hourly productivity of the SuperConstellation was seven times greater than that of the Douglas DC The earlyturbo-prop aircraft also significantly improved productivity.
Likewise, theBritannias were a significant improvement on the Super Constellations they weremeant to replace. The arrival of the turbo-jet engine had a twofold impact. In the early s theturbo-jets led to a dramatic increase in speeds, while the size of the aircraft didnot increase appreciably. In the later s and early s there was noappreciable increase in speeds, because existing speeds were approaching thesound barrier, but there was a significant increase in the size of aircraft.
Theseearlier increases in aircraft speed and the later increases in size together producedmajor improvements in aircraft productivity so that while the Boeing B in was producing 11, tonne-kilometres per flying hour, only 10 years laterthe hourly productivity of the Boeing was three times as great.
The next major breakthrough was the production of civil aircraft This is likely to be an under. Assume 3, flying hours. Compiled by author. The Anglo-French Concorde, whichentered service in , flies more than twice as fast as its predecessors. Yet it isable to do this only through a very significant reduction in size.
Because of thispenalty, supersonic aircraft have a lower hourly productivity than their It is this factor which makes their commercialviability so problematical. From the mids onwards the rate of technological innovation slackened. Attention switched from the long-haul end of the aircraft market to thedevelopment of more efficient short- to medium-haul aircraft such as the Boeing and the Airbus A Developments here were based essentially on existingengine and airframe technology, though there were major developments inavionics, the use of lighter composite materials in airframe construction andother areas.
At the same time, the trend towards larger aircraft flying at the samespeed continues. An example is the Airbus A introduced in , which, withup to seats, is significantly larger than the — seater aircraft it isintended to replace. Thus important gains in hourly productivity continue to bemade as airlines switch to larger newer aircraft types. The other important development since the mids has been theintroduction of extended range versions of the newer twin-engined jets such asthe Boeing These allow more direct non-stop flights on thinner long-haulroutes that could not support the large traditional long-haul aircraft such as theBoeing For agiven level of propulsive thrust successive engines were able to carry a largerpayload and to carry it faster as well.
This, combined with other economiesarising from the greater size of aircraft, resulted in ever-decreasing costs percapacity tonne-kilometre. Herein lies the significance of the technologicalimprovements in aviation and of the increase in aircraft productivity which theymade possible. They enabled airlines to cut their costs of production steadilythroughout the s and s both in current values and in real terms Figure 1. During the s, airline unit costs expressed in current valuesbegan to rise rapidly as a result of world inflation.
They rose particularly sharplyfollowing the fuel crises of and The airlines tried to counteract theupward pressure on costs by the accelerated introduction of more modern andusually larger jet aircraft and by more effective cost control. As a result, airlinecosts did not rise as rapidly as world prices, so that in real or constant valueterms airline costs during the s remained stable or moved slowlydownwards Figure 1.
In the s the price of fuel began to decline in realterms, falling particularly sharply in It then fluctuated around this low level. Helped by both the switch to larger aircraft and the fall in the realprice of fuel, airline costs again declined in constant value terms during the earlys but stabilized in the second half of the decade.
Compiled using ICAO data. The technological developments in aviation, while they were beneficial intheir impact on operating costs and in improving safety, also created problems.
Theincreasing size and capacity of aircraft and the speed with which new, largeraircraft were introduced, often in reaction to competition from other airlines, Average load factors ofICAO International Civil Aviation Organization scheduled airlines droppedfrom a level of around 60 per cent in the early s to levels below 48 per centby Figure 1. There was a significant fall in load factors between and with the widespread introduction of the first general jets, and thenagain between and with the introduction of the early wide-bodied jets.
Both these periods of overcapacity were marked by sharply falling profitmargins. The airlines did not learn their lesson until or It was onlythen that, in a major effort to counteract the effects of cost inflation, airlines cuttheir frequencies, often dramatically as more Boeing s, DCs or LockheedTristars were introduced into service. By the late s load factors began toapproach the 60 per cent level again. But deregulation of air services, particularlyon the North Atlantic and transPacific routes, with the resultant increase in thenumber of carriers in many markets combined with a general world recession,pushed overall load factors down in the early s.
They then rose slowly in thesecond half of the s and steadied at around 60—61 per cent. This means thatmore than a third of airline capacity each year is wasted. The technical innovations also posed the problem of financing the new capitalinvestments which they made necessary. While the operating costs per capacitytonne-kilometre were falling there was a very rapid escalation in the capital costof new aircraft.
These figures are indicative of the scale of investment necessary from theend of the s onwards for a large international airline. Not only did aircraftprices escalate but interest rates also escalated from 4 to 6 per cent per annum inthe early s to a peak of over 16 per cent, though they decreasedsubsequently and were around 9—12 per cent for most of the s. Two developments eased the problem of raising capital on this scale. First, theaircraft manufacturers became increasingly involved with raising capital fortheir customers, either through the commercial banks in their own country orthrough special export trade banks, such as the United States Export-ImportBank.
Manufacturers vied with each other to get better financing arrangementsfor their clients, and the terms of such download loans became an increasingly Secondly, thereemerged consortia of banks which downloadd aircraft and then leased them to theairlines.
The consortia enjoyed tax concessions and also retained ownership ofthe aircraft, which was a valuable security at a time when the resale value ofaircraft was high. But for the airlines this was a mixed blessing.
It pushedthem to invest when they should have been holding back. The result was that bythe early s many major airlines were heavily over-indebted. In other words,the ratio of their debts to their equity capital became much too high. When trafficfailed to reach the forecast levels, airlines were no longer able to service thesehuge debts.
Several carriers, such as Braniff and Laker in , collapsedsuddenly as their creditors ran out of patience and refused to reschedule debtrepayments. The low traffic growth rates achieved by many international airlines during theearly s resulted in a slackening off of new aircraft orders.
Then the highgrowth rates of —9 generated a boom in orders led by the bigger airlines andthe aircraft leasing companies, which placed particularly large orders on behalfof existing and prospective customers. Many of these customers were the smallairlines which were unable to self-finance new downloads or to get such good dealselsewhere as they could through the leasing companies. By the beginning of there were outstanding orders for close on 7, jet airliners for delivery inthe 10 years between and The projected annual delivery rate of about a year was almost double that achieved during the s AM, Thishuge extra capacity coming into the world market every year was likely to havean adverse impact on load factors during the s unless traffic grew morerapidly than expected or older aircraft were retired at a faster rate.
Trying tomatch rapidly increasing capacity with a slower growth in demand was to be oneof the major headaches of airline managers during the s. This consistently high growth rate wasunmatched by any other transport mode during this period, with the possibleexception of international shipping, and that for a short time only. Since airtransport growth has slackened. In the year period from to theaverage annual growth rate fell to just below 10 per cent, and in the following 10years average growth was only a little above 8 per cent per annum.
But this wasstill high compared with most other industries. The high though declining growth rates mask quite diverse growth patterns onparticular routes or in particular countries or geographical areas. Long-termregional variations in growth trends are illustrated in Table 1. This shows that,in terms of both international and domestic tonne-kilometres performed, the In terms of both international and domestic traffic, the Asian andPacific airlines have achieved annual growth rates well above the world average,as they had done throughout the s.
Some airlines within this region achievedexceptionally high average growth rates on their international traffic: The very rapid growth of Asian airlines completely changed the structure ofthe international airline industry. In , European and North American airlinestogether generated almost three-quarters ofTable 1. Region of airline registration International t-km Domestic t-kmAsia and Pacific ICAO This dominant position has been significantlyeroded.
North American airlines have ceded second place to the Asian carriers. However, the American share has actually increased slightly after reaching a lowpoint in the early s as US airlines became more aggressive followingderegulation in the United States. The reasons for the relatively rapid overall growth rate of air transport are notdifficult to find. The falling level of operating costs, previously described,enabled airlines to offer tariffs that were lower in real terms.
The yield oraverage fare charged per passenger-kilometre declined rapidly up to in realterms, that is in relation to the cost of other goods and services Figure 1. Thisdecline occurred at a time when per capita incomes in the developed countries ofthe world were increasing at a rate of 8 per cent per annum, while discretionaryincomes were growing at an even faster rate.
As a consequence, the demand for At the same time, the 20 years to saw aboom in world trade which generated an increase both in business travel and inthe demand for air freight facilities.
The fall in the real cost of freight chargeswas even more marked than the decline in the real value of passenger fares. During the s the real cost of air transport in many markets continued todecline but more slowly and with some up and downs. Disposable incomes alsorose, though less rapidly than before.
It was not until and the two or threeyears that followed that economic recession affecting many developed countriesbegan seriously to undermine demand and annual growth rates declinedappreciably, even though real air fares fell rapidly as a result of over-capacityand deregulation in some markets Figure 1.
Towards the end of the decade,however, growth of scheduled traffic began to accelerate, especially oninternational routes. International scheduled traffic grew 14 per cent in and10 per cent in and was expected to be about 9 per cent higher in Butwas this merely a short-term reaction following the poor years at the beginningof the decade, or was it an improvement in the underlying trend which wouldcontinue well into the s?
Table 1. The rapid growth in air transport was characterized by two features. Secondly, the profitability of airlines during the last 30 years hasbeen fairly marginal despite the rapid growth of demand for their services. These early non-scheduledoperations were largely associated with military and government charters andwith single-entity charters, that is where single persons or organizations werechartering aircraft for their own exclusive use.
In the early s, developments were taking place which would dramaticallyaccelerate the development of non-scheduled traffic after These subsequentlyspread to other long-haul markets.
Such affinity charters arose when societies orclubs, whose total membership was normally limited to 20, members andwhose prime purpose was other than travel, chartered aircraft for their memberswho shared the cost equally. In the United States, the Civil Aeronautics Acthad allowed non-scheduled operations under a general exemption fromregulations which affected scheduled carriers.
But in Public Law 87—confined the role of supplemental carriers exclusively to non-scheduledoperations and authorized the Civil Aeronautics Board CAB to certifysupplemental carriers to operate in designated geographical areas. In time, 13supplemental carriers were certified. An inclusive tour is a holiday package where a singlecharge includes travel, hotel accommodation and possibly local ground transport,visits, etc.
Rapidly developing new holiday markets with affinity group chartersand ITCs and, at the same time, bolstered by the operation of substantial militarycharters in support of the Vietnam war, United States non-scheduled operationsgrew at a phenomenal rate. Between and total passenger milesoperated by the US supplementals quadrupled. High growth continued until about when military charters began to decline.
The European airlines, meanwhile, has based their own non-scheduledoperations on inclusive tour charters, and were less dependent than theirAmerican counterparts on affinity group or military charters. The developmentof ITCs by the British private airlines in the early s was followed by theformation of charter companies in Scandinavia and later in Germany andelsewhere.
These and other companies concentrated on the carriage of high-density ITC traffics between northern and western Europe and the resorts of theMediterranean, especially those of Spain and Italy, and, to a much lesser extent,those of Greece, Yugoslavia and Tunisia. Growth was rapid, especially after when the charter companies began to introduce the most modern jetequipment. Between and ITC traffic in Europe grew at an averageannual rate of 25 per cent, which was more than double the growth rate ofscheduled intra-European traffic Cambau and Lefevre, The Europeanairlines, both scheduled and non-scheduled, began to develop long-haul charters Thesewere to a large extent affinity group charters, though ITCs also played a part.
The expansion of non-scheduled services was facilitated in the early s bythe trend in the United States and some countries in Europe towards theliberalization of often arbitrary regulations limiting passenger access to charterflights. Growing much more rapidly than scheduled services, non-scheduledoperations captured an increasing share of the total international air traffic. By it was estimated that 31 per cent of international passenger traffic wascarried on non-scheduled services ICAO, That was the peakpenetration achieved by non-scheduled carriers.
From then on the charter shareof the total passenger market gradually declined to a level of about 16—20 percent. In it was This relative decline of non-scheduled traffic in the s can be explained bytwo parallel developments. First, in the years after the fuel crisis of —4 thehighest growth rates were experienced in markets where non-scheduled serviceswere basically not permitted by the regulatory authorities, namely in the MiddleEast and in the Asia-Pacific region.
High growth in these regions was therebyinevitably concentrated on scheduled services. Secondly, the furtherdevelopment of non-scheduled traffic in its two major markets either sloweddown, which was the case in Europe, or actually went into decline, whichhappened on the North Atlantic route. Liberalization of charter regulations had resulted in a rapid growth of non-scheduled traffic on the North Atlantic route Table 1. Despite a hiccup in, charter traffic grew faster than scheduled traffic until , when itrepresented Then in the charter market collapsed.
This was a direct result of deregulation of fares andentry on many North Atlantic scheduled routes. Several new low-cost airlines,such as Laker Airways, began operating scheduled services. Competitivepressure pushed both new and existing scheduled carriers to offer fares whichwere charter competitive. With little price advantage to offer, charter airlinesfound their traffic shrinking rapidly.
It was not until that they managed toslow the decline, but only for a time. By only 2 million passengerstravelled across the Atlantic on charter flights, half the number that had usedcharter flights at their peak in By for the first time non-scheduled passenger-kilometreson international charters in Europe exceeded passenger-kilometres generated byinternational scheduled services Cambau and Lefevre, But in —4 thefirst oil crisis hit the non-scheduled sector of the market much harder than thescheduled sector.
The ITC passengers were more price sensitive and moresensitive to the economic situation than the up-market tourists and the The high charter growth ratesof earlier years disappeared.
Between and the end of the decade charter andscheduled international traffic grew at fairly similar rates and it was not until theend of the decade that charter traffic growth began to accelerate again. In the 10years to charter passengers in Europe grew at an average annual rate of 7. But these were significantly lower overall growth rates than hasbeen achieved in earlier decades.
International Air Transport Association, Geneva. On a number of European air routes, charter carriers have captured over 80 percent and sometimes over 90 per cent of the total air market, to the virtualexclusion of scheduled operations. By far the largest single air market in Europe is thatbetween the UK and Spain, which in generated Nearly 9 million of these, or about 80 per cent of the total, travelled on charterflights.
Here as on many other Mediterranean routes, charters are dominant. It isdifficult to obtain precise figures for the overall market split within Europe One estimate suggests that in 45per cent of air passengers within western Europe travelled on charter flights ICAO, The charter share would decline if one considered the whole ofEurope.
But, in terms of passenger-kilometres, the charter share rises to wellover half because charter services are generally operated on the longer sectorsbetween northern and Mediterranean Europe. An optimistic estimate hassuggested that in charters generated close to 70 per cent of internationalpassenger-kilometres within Europe Burnell, Whatever the precisefigures, charters clearly represent about half the intra-European air transportmarket.
Yet their importance is frequently underestimated. Overall, non-scheduled operations have been characterized by particularfeatures. First, in the period up to the mids, non-scheduled traffic grewmuch more rapidly than scheduled.
Secondly, non-scheduled operations areprimarily international. Of the total passenger-kilometres generated on non-scheduled services, 94 per cent are on international flights ICAO, Theirshare drops to 81 per cent in terms of tonne-kilometres when freight is included. Finally, scheduled airlines play a major role in non-scheduled operations. Then the rapid expansion of the supplemental carriers inthe United States and of the large charter airlines in Europe and elsewherepushed the scheduled carriers out of the non-scheduled markets.
Scheduledcarriers were for a time constrained from entering such markets because ofregulations imposed by the International Air Transport Association IATA or bytheir own governments. Some scheduled airlines, especially those in Europe, setup charter subsidiaries to circumvent such regulations. Most of these charter companies are now owned per cent by theirscheduled parent airlines. But in some cases the parent company is not the soleowner.
Thus Swissair owns In the United States where, prior to deregulation, scheduledairlines could not by law establish charter subsidiaries, airlines such as PanAmerican Airways Pan Am entered charter markets in their own right, andcompeted directly with US supplemental charter carriers in those marketswhere the Civil Aeronautics Board CAB allowed them to.
Outside Europe andNorth America few countries enjoyed the luxury of separate charter andscheduled carriers. The national scheduled airlines carried charter traffic asnecessary.
While several very large independent non-scheduled airlines haveemerged, such as Britannia UK , about 55 per cent of the total non-scheduledtraffic is carried either by charter subsidiaries of scheduled airlines or by airlinesthat operate both scheduled and non-scheduled services Table 1.
A major problem facing airlines andTable 1. In two major international air markets, the NorthAtlantic and more especially the Europe-Mediterranean area, charter competitionhas been and remains a worrying fact of life for the scheduled airlines. As aresult of such competition, the operational and other distinctions betweenscheduled and non-scheduled have become increasingly blurred and difficult tomaintain.
But the charter airlines, mostly European, also face a major problemduring the s and that is how to cope with European liberalization as itgathers pace. In the United States, deregulation in led to the virtual eclipseof the supplemental airlines section 4.
Will the same happen inEurope? While this has been the case for many individual airlines, theprofitability of the airline industry world wide during the last 25 years has beenmarginal.
Only in the period —8 were significant profits achieved and againin —9. The traditional measure of profitability, namely the rate of return on assetsemployed, cannot be applied to the airline industry as a whole. This is because ofthe difficulty of estimating real asset values for airlines with varied depreciationpolicies, using varying proportions of leased equipment and often receiving director indirect government subsidy in a variety of forms.
The operating profit is before interestcharges and other non-operating items. Net profit is after payment of interest andinclusion of these other items. Between and the world airline industry experienced five distinctphases in its financial fortunes: Faresand, more important, revenue yields were also falling during this period but lessrapidly than the fall in costs. This, together with rising unit costs from The period —75 ischaracterized by poor financial results, particularly in and As areaction to these poor results the airlines made determined efforts to improveload factors and were partially successful in this Figure 1.
Attempts to improve financial results were completely upset by the fuel pricecrisis which followed the Arab-Israeli war of October In the first place, the price of fuelescalated at an alarming rate. The average fuel price paid by IATA airlinesdoubled in the four months between September and January andcontinued to increase thereafter, but at a slower rate Figure 5. By mid airlines were paying three timesas much for fuel as they had been paying two years earlier.
Lastly, the downturnin economic growth, particularly in Europe and the United States, resulted indeclining or very low rates of increase in real disposable income, whichadversely affected the demand for both passenger and freight transport. PDF read Dancing Women: PDF read Divine Economy: Stephen Long. PDF read Emotional Weight: PDF read European Business: PDF read Executive Eq: PDF read Facercise: PDF read Finding Kansas: Post-Keynesian Perspectives Online Best - by.
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