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The genealogy of the notion of private property shows that asking whether a capitalist state can emerge without violations of self-ownership cannot help settling the question of state legitimacy, because the notion of private property presupposed by that question is a product of the power structure it is supposed to help legitimise, namely the state. We anchor our genealogical critique in recent work on ideology in epistemology and philosophy of language, and in current debates on the methodology of political philosophy. Our broader aim is to show how there is room for genealogical ideology critique within normative political theory. But, unlike more traditional approaches that aim to debunk whole concepts or even entire belief systems, we propose a more targeted, argument-specific form of ideology critique. Introductory 0. That is a harsh way of putting a point, yet some libertarians may welcome it, insofar as it exemplifies part of the intuitive appeal of their position: we have property rights regardless of the political system we live under. In this paper we contest the use of that folk view in arguments about the legitimacy of state power. We put forward a fourth, perhaps more radical kind of critique: we try to show how Nozick asks the wrong question about state legitimacy. Our contention is that some of those assumptions, while perhaps tenable in their own right, should not feature in the sorts of arguments Nozick and others want to deploy them in. We use empirical evidence from history and anthropology to show that folk notions of private property—down to and including self- ownership—are statist in an unacknowledged way, which disqualifies them from featuring in arguments about state legitimacy.

Since the first ninety percent of human history occurred within the social structure of hunter-gathering bands, it is important to be clear about the kind of meaning property acquired within these societies.

It was generally recognised that the purpose of access to land and other key productive resources was sustenance, and that sustenance required appropriation of some kind. What it did not require, however, was ownership in Lockean-Nozickian, PP1 sense of the term.

The prevailing principle was that no individual or, most commonly, family could claim exclusive use of any piece of land, and no individual or family could be excluded from resources they needed to subsist.

All this principle required was some form of use-rights, not exclusive individual ownership. The transition from mobile hunter-gathering to sedentary tribal societies does not seem to have fundamentally altered this pattern.

With some partial exceptions in pastoralist societies Porter , the key consideration remained land-use, not the exclusive individual ownership of property Sahlins It is only with the rise of chiefdoms and states that patterns of appropriation change. Chiefs were individuals who were powerful enough—in a context of population pressure and thus increasing competition for scarce land resources—to appropriate for their clans land previously held in common Earle Access to land became restricted, with small sections of the population now in a position to determine who had access to what.

The dynamics of appropriation in early states were similar. An influential study of seven early civilisations Aztec, Maya, Yoruba-Benin, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Shang China concludes that "the replacement of collectively owned land by increasing proportions of [ One common way in which private land originally spread can be traced to the decision on the part of these rulers to reward officials and others members of the elite for their services with exclusive titles to land Trigger Comparable processes were—and to some extent still are—at work in shepherding societies as well Farringdon Historical evidence confirms that the legal systems of these proto-states and early states were geared towards the protection of these forms of property held by elites, typically in connection with gendered and kin-defined hierarchies Bouchard , Gailey It is important to stress that chiefs and early state elites introduced patterns of ownership of a PP1-like kind.

Typically, land was removed from the commons and ownership transferred to groups or institutions. If one looks for PP1 as we now understand it—land owned by individuals free to dispose of it as they see fit—one still finds that "there is no evidence It is only in later civilisations such as Rome and medieval Europe and, more consistently, with the consolidation of the modern state, that PP1 acquired the form and political centrality it currently manifests.

Most recently, the state-backed enclosure movement in England of the sixteenth century exemplifies a pattern of coercive 13The scholarly debate on the origins of private property is ongoing.

Here we rely on the mainstream perspective. However, we should note the case of Holocene complex foraging societies, which preceded chiefdoms and, according to some, represent a partial exception to the PP2 norm by displaying a family- based variant of PP1 Johnsen In any case, if the argument in sections 3 and 4 succeeds, even uncertainty about the origins of private property will be enough to cast doubt on the libertarian argument we attack.

The simpler the reality, the easier it is to assess it and manage it.

The coercive transition from the complexity of PP2 to the simplicity of PP1 can be read as state simplification. By making property regimes more simple, PP1 made them also more legible and, most importantly, taxable ibid. European colonialism spread this radical simplification of ownership titles and notions of property to the rest of the world.

Definitions of capitalism vary; yet all accept that the political centrality of PP1 is a necessary condition for the emergence of capitalism. Historical evidence suggests that this radical simplification in property relations was first conceived in early states and came to fruition under the aegis of the modern state Pierson As Hume and Kant understood, property is not a relation between a subject and an object, but a social construct Waldron A change in property relations is premised on a change in social relations.

The state—in both its pre-modern and modern articulations—brought about such a radical transformation in social relations, a critical expression of which was the entrenchment of the political salience of PP1. Abstractions and reality 3. What is often taken by libertarians to be the spontaneous expression of the free individual human will—i. PP1-based capitalism—turns out to be something of a radically different nature.

PP1 does not give rise to the state, it is the other way around. Crudely, because the political centrality of private property rights was established by 14E. In this section we leverage our historical and genealogical observations to build the bare bones of an objection to libertarian defences of capitalism.

Reality check

In the next section we clarify the view of ideology that underpins our objection. Let us begin by restating the basic libertarian argument in defence of the capitalist state: P1: Any socio-political system that can emerge and reproduce itself without violations of individual rights is legitimate. P2: Only capitalism can emerge and reproduce itself without violations of individual rights. C: Only capitalism is legitimate.

We should now unpack it to see exactly what role private property PP1 plays in it: P1: People have private property rights over their bodies self-ownership. P2: Self-owners can legitimately acquire external private property. P3: Private property enables legitimate market transactions free market. P4: Only a state no bigger than a minimal state can arise spontaneously and legitimately as a result of a process kick-started through market transactions. PP1 plays a role both within self-ownership and world- ownership i.

The common understanding of self-ownership requires PP1, so much so that sophisticated philosophical critiques are needed to cash out relationship to our own bodies in non- property terms Attas , McElwee , 16 though our argument does not depend on those critiques. At any rate, the libertarian argument can be understood as a conditional: if there can be private property before the state, then a minimal state can emerge without coercion. Now, while a spontaneous transition from A to B is strictly-speaking possible, the empirical evidence we presented in the previous section shows that it never occurred in actual history despite vast contextual differences.

The widespread acceptance of the centrality of private property to political order postdates the state, and is a product of its agency, though not only of its agency. That does not make the argument unsound or invalid, but it does show that, in order to get the desired pro-capitalist conclusions, Nozick has to build equally pro-capitalist normative commitments into the premises.

The argument is not as parsimonious as it purports to be. But our charge is not simply one of circularity, for a libertarian might well reply that she is simply spelling out the implication of the appealing, intuitive normative commitment to private property rights. Our objection—in its crudest form—is that libertarians cannot use the intuitive appeal of private property entitlements in their defence of the capitalist state, because the historical record shows that widespread belief in the central political relevance of those commitments is the causal product of the very coercive order the belief is meant to support.

To be sure, a libertarian could have formed that belief in some other way; but given the empirical evidence in support of the state as the proximate cause, the burden is on the libertarian to show that the belief is warranted by other considerations. To be sure, a philosophically sophisticated freestanding defence of PP1 as a near-absolute side constraint could be found, just as our critique can be formulated despite the social pressures in support of the political centrality of PP1.

But the point remains that the widespread, folk appeal of PP1 vaunted by libertarians is susceptible to genealogical debunking. In other words, to resist our argument libertarians would have to navigate some troubled philosophical waters that they often, and understandably, try to avoid—e.

We discuss other such views as well as their political appropriations towards the end of this section. But, absent further arguments—which Nozick explicitly declines providing 9 —that line of thought is compatible with any number of conceptions of rights, or even with other accounts of the limits of state power. To dispel some immediate doubts about our objection, two related clarifications are in order.

First, we are not claiming that the coercive nature of the historical institution of private property is a problematic violation of the libertarian commitment to voluntarism and self-ownership. More generally, the issue is not that, in establishing private property rights, early states did something impermissible. We can remain neutral on that question. As Williams recognises, this approach raises a number of further questions, e. Perhaps more importantly, why exactly does the justification not count?

We will explore those and other related questions in section 4. The discussion of ideology in section 4 will unpack this thought. First, the Nozickian may reply that the invisible hand scenario is meant to portray a situation in which people like us i. How this applies to any actual state is another matter.

At the limit, a Nozickian could claim that the state she wants to justify is other than any existing states, and that the theory is not intended as a blueprint for modifying existing states.

Two rejoinders are in order here. Or consider the debate on inheritance tax. Second, Nozick acknowledges that differences between his hypothetical story and the actual world carry normative weight: More complicated are the cases where the actual history of an existing society is unjust yet some hypothetical just history could have led to the current structure though perhaps not to the particular distribution of holdings or positions under it. The distinction between the institutional structure and the distribution of entitlements under it is important, though often overlooked by critics and defenders of Nozick alike, and even by Nozick himself.

If I have a right to myself I have a right to what I produce, as against all men, even if they are organized and possess political power. Their combination has to be compatible with a measure of negative liberty for their bearers,21 which is why Nozick introduces the need for the theory of justice in acquisition. But that is just to say that if appropriation is permissible, it should follow certain rules.

He assumes that one or the other will do. Even if one is willing to grant the self-ownership assumption, this assumption that there must be a correct theory to justify the acquisition of private property in the external world should alarm ideology critics. Other libertarians have tried to fill this gap in the position, e. Our argument would still apply, as self-ownership is a form of PP1.

This move arguably conflates the conditions for specific acts of acquisition with the general permissibility of acquisition, where the former should be treated as conditional on the latter. Mack 25 and so remain untouched by our argument, others, like Nozick, rely on the folk appeal of PP1.

This move in turn requires a distinction between common sense moral philosophy and common sense political philosophy, with the latter cast as unreliable.

Reality Check at the Bottom of the Pyramid

But part of what our ideology critique aims to show—as we argue in more detail in 4. At any rate, our aim here was just to highlight how, within some versions of academic libertarianism, folk beliefs about private property perform two separate tasks: establishing the appeal of self-ownership, and establishing the appeal of world- ownership. Setting aside the difficulties with the latter, we want to focus on why self-ownership seems to require less by way of argument to get off the ground.

Why it is that the relationship between an agent and her own body should be thought of through the lens of a political-legal construct such as PP1? The answer, we suggest, has something to do with the pervasiveness of a statist- capitalist ideology. Whether this is a problem for libertarians will depend on how exactly such an ideology may warp our normative commitments—the subject of the next section.

Ideology and political moralism 4. As such it falls outside the scope of this paper. Call that the realist desideratum. Call that the debunking desideratum. But, even though it is compatible with it, the desideratum does not require commitment to that general approach. Here we are criticising libertarians who help themselves to a folk belief in private property rights to support a controversial political position.

Any critique of this move cannot itself rely on any such folk beliefs—at least not without subjecting them to the same critical standards, which would derail the exercise. It is unclear how that aspiration differs in relevant ways from, say, the aspiration to hold secure private property rights. To avoid that worry while retaining the causal element in the critical theory principle we propose to motivate it with epistemic rather than moral considerations.

To achieve that we will i displace the causal element from the process of belief acquisition 27 We remain neutral on the plausibility of more normatively laden accounts of ideology in the pejorative sense, i. For this sort of more comprehensive definition of ideology in the pejorative sense see Geuss 12ff. This neutrality also allows us to escape some charges of seeking an Archimedean standpoint Srinivasan For a rejection of this sort of move in relation to ideology critique see Stanley Haslanger account of social construction draws on the distinction between internalism and externalism in semantics.

Attention to the causal history of the concept will then provide a better understanding of how the concept works ibid. One can be a competent user of the manifest concept without fully understanding the operative concept, which is why we can carry out empirically-informed ameliorative conceptual analysis, e. In the case of race, say, this is a way to account for its social construction, and so to open some avenues for critique.

In the case of private property, the manifest concept of private property is one that sees this right as a constraint on state activity, and so as a notion that can feature in accounts of state legitimacy. The meaning of PP1, then, is best understood partly by considering the causal history of the concept and the role it plays in our social and political practices.

The empirical component of our analysis provides an epistemic reason to divert our attention from the manifest to the operative concept of private property—the latter simply is a more accurate description of the role played by the concept in our practices.

So we have provided two jointly sufficient conditions for triggering the Critical Theory Principle: that an epistemically ameliorable politically charged concept features in the relevant argument, and that this concept is resistant to amelioration despite the empirical evidence. Note how the identification of the epistemic flaw rests on the plausibility of the causal account of the operative concept,33 so the debunking desideratum is met. But no moral notions are invoked in the debunking process: the flaw is epistemic, so the realistic desideratum is met.

Regardless of what one thinks of the role of intuitions in epistemology and metaphysics, there is reason to be weary of intuitions in political philosophy. He imagines people in the state of nature with the sorts of rights we think people have because we live under a capitalist system. He never explains why it is a good idea to ascribe such rights of self-ownership. As we have seen, he may reply that he simply wants to come up with a theory that appeals to people like us.

But this undermines his methodology: it is hardly surprising that people like us have certain intuitions and beliefs about rights and the state, and to derive conclusions from those and then demand that we use those conclusions to disregard other intuitions we may have e.

Gaus Our methodological criticism, then, ties in with an aspect of the wider realist critique of mainstream political theory: political prescriptions derived exclusively or primarily from pre-political moral commitments can turn out to be ideological in self-defeating or, at any rate, problematic ways.

Rather, some such intuitions and beliefs are not suited to the tasks assigned to them. So we have shown that there is a role for genealogical ideology critique within normative political theory. But this role is different—narrower and more targeted—than the one found within traditional forms of ideology critique. Our critique targets specific uses of a concept within specific arguments.

It does not seek to taint whole concepts because of their unsavoury pedigree. And when it does rule out the use of a concept in a given argument, it does so on epistemic rather than moral grounds.

It is precisely the commitment to widely shared epistemic values that counsels genealogical scrutiny of concepts used to justify power relations, lest the boundary between truth and power become blurrier than it needs to be. References Attas, D. Freedom and Self-Ownership. Social Theory and Practice, 26 1 :1— Bader, R. Robert Nozick. London: Continuum. Barry, B. Political Theory, 3 3 : Bertram, C. Property in the Moral Life of Human Beings. Social Philosophy and Policy, 30 : — Bouchard, M.

The State of the Study of the State in Anthropology. Reviews in Anthropology, 40 3 : Chartier, G. New York: Minor Compositions. Chodorov, F. Socialism Via Taxation. Rescuing Justice and Equality. Daniels, N. Wide Reflective Equilibrium. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Deagan, K.

Nomadic Peoples, 9. Feser, E. Social Philosophy and Policy, 22 1 , pp. Freeden, M. The Political Theory of Political Thinking. Fried, M. New York: Random House. Gailey, C. The State of the State in Anthropology. Dialectical Anthropology, 9 1: Galston, W. Realism in political theory. European Journal of Political Theory, 9 4 , pp. Gaus, G. Bader and John Meadowcroft. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gendler, T. Alief and Belief. Journal of Philosophy, 10 : Geuss, R. The Idea of a Critical Theory.

The Reality Check – Heidi Haavik

Philosophy and Real Politics. Gibson, D. Chiefdoms and the Emergence of Private Property in Land.

Journal of Anthropological Archaeology, 27 1 : 46— Graeber, D. Debt: The First 5, Years. New York: Melville House. Granovetter, M. American Journal of Sociology, 91 3 , pp. Haslanger, S. Resisting Reality. Huemer, M. The Problem of Political Authority. New York: Macmillan.

Johnsen, D. The Journal of Legal Studies, 15 1 , pp. Jost, J. Part 2 of the paper provides a that people will be able to interact with digital background overview of government ICT projects resources at any time and in any place. Mobility has barriers and Part 3 outlines the methodology of the become one of the most important technology and paper.

Part 4 describes the findings of the survey, while communication trends of the 21st Century , affecting the conclusion and future directions are contained in all facets of modern life including mobile information Part 5.

Mobile government refers to electronic government services capable of 2. Background being delivered via mobile user interfaces, or in some instances, special mobile services such as location- There have been numerous attempts to define based services, provided by the government [1].

Field workers, which verified the implementation of eGovernment customs inspectors, immigration agents, local council projects. He suggests that there is always a gap officers, medical and law enforcement and military between design and reality, and in order to minimize personnel can all benefit from access to current data to this gap, he divides factors of success and failure of make better, faster, decisions [2]. In order for those eGovernment projects into two categories: drivers and services to be successful, their initiating projects have enablers.

Other researchers viewed barriers to to be established on facts about the validity of the government electronically-rendered services from mobile service itself. Not every government service different aspects. These comments are briefly the very low cost, only because they could not discussed in Section 5 of this paper.

Methodology [10]. Others [11] consider negative experiences and failures as a barrier against using a service again. A Researchers were seen as an important source of recent report by the Australian Government [12] knowledge as their work requires familiarity with all reveals that lack of trust in online transactions also the developments in the field [15].

An extensive review represents a barrier to using an online service.

The selection criterion for researchers and academics was at Table 1: Mobile Acceptance Factors [13] least one peer-reviewed journal or conference Mobile Details about Mobile publication regarding mobile and electronic Technology Technologies Factors government.

Industry Availability devices will be used for a wide experts were sourced from different areas such as range of activities communication companies, mobile phone suppliers, If complex or lengthy tasks are application developers and consultants. The involved participants were researchers also attended eGovernment and Effort involved unwilling to invest required mGovernment conferences and trade shows to source effort likely experts.

As [15] stated, such stakeholders, due Convenience Important for users to their first-hand experience, are likely to know Physical limitations including exactly what helps and hinders successful diffusion of clumsy input and output mobile government. This survey tool was chosen as the and security. This survey is still in progress and ongoing distrust of electronic currently 35 usable responses have been received and transactions.

Little access to public sector Lack of public services; the chief service 3. The Survey Instrument sector services accessed was transport information. UTS Survey Manager was the survey instrument. The web-based survey consisted of enforcement management as they promise to enhance two sections; the first part elicited demographic efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness and information whilst the second part included two open accountability at federal, state and local levels [14].

In Tsunami in December , Hurricane Katrina in new this paper, analysis of these suggestions is handled Orleans, August and Cyclones Larry and Monica building on another paper that detailed the main in Queensland Australia in March , provide barriers [16]. Sampling Technique threatened populations. The research reveals a large diversity of opinions This study was based upon stratified purposive about barriers and their suggested solutions depending sampling, which means that cases were selected from on the type of barrier and the perspective from which previously identified subgroups [17].

Stratified purposive sampling aims to create rich, in-depth information [15, 18]. The thirty five 35 respondents who completed the web survey are grouped as: university professors and teachers 13 , eGovernment Figure 2, where most mGovernment service As purposive sampling is used to the point of implementations and research are occurring. Accordingly, redundancy is the primary criterion 5 that will determine when the sampling in this study should terminate; currently the survey is still up and 4 continuing.

Johnson [19] suggested a strategy to promote the 3 validity of qualitative research such as our open ended 2 questions further discussed in part 5. This percentage reflects that new mobile technologies and services are The author targeted researchers and experts in the gaining the interest of experts Age: aged 20 - The second survey will take into Demographic Data Such a percentage of returns indicates the high level of A web-based survey was conducted to extract commitment to these targeted experts and confirms our opinions from both expert practitioners, and Mobile government selection criteria as valid.

The open question about No the main barriers to success in mobile service projects Figure 6 illustrates the categorisation of the barriers and their suggested solutions across three axes: Organisational,

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